Selective law enforcement against Russian NGOs : pursuing informal interests through formal means by Bækken, Håvard
Selective Law Enforcement 
against Russian NGOs 
Pursuing Informal Interests through Formal Means 
Håvard Bækken 
 
MASTER’S THESIS – EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Spring 2009 
 2 
Content 
CONTENT ..............................................................................................................................2 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................................5 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................6 
1.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION .............................................................. 7 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS.............................................................................................. 8 
1.4 CONTEXT............................................................................................................................... 10 
2. METHOD AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES...................................................15 
2.1 SELECTION OF EMPIRICAL DATA ........................................................................................... 16 
2.2 USING INTERVIEWS IN ACADEMIC RESEARCH ....................................................................... 20 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK............................................................................22 
3.1 A DISCUSSION ON INTERRELATIONS ...................................................................................... 23 
3.2 SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT – A THEORETICAL MODEL ................................................. 30 
4. NGOS AND THE FORMAL ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE IN RUSSIA ......39 
4.1 FORMAL REGULATION OF NGOS ACTIVITIES 2006-2008 ...................................................... 39 
4.2 FORMAL PROSECUTION OF THE INFORMANTS’ NGOS ........................................................... 51 
4.3 THE LEGAL FOUNDATION - A TYPOLOGY OF INCOHERENCE.................................................. 58 
4.4 PUNISHMENT – MORE THAN LEGAL SANCTIONS ................................................................... 63 
 
 3 
5. INFORMALITY IN SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT......................69 
5.1 GOVERNMENTAL PRESSURE ON RUSSIAN NGOS ...................................................................69 
5.2 MY INFORMANTS’ TAKE ON INFORMAL RULES ......................................................................74 
5.3 UNDERSTANDING INFORMAL RULES – THEIR NATURE, ORIGIN AND COMMUNICATION. ........80 
6. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS...........85 
6.1 SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A GOVERNMENTAL TOOL ...............................................85 
6.2 UNDERSTANDING PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT ............................................................................90 
7. CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................................97 
7.1 A SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATED VARIABLES....................................................................97 
7.2 FINDINGS, DISCOURSES AND SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..................99 
LITERATURE........................................................................................................104 
INTERVIEWS........................................................................................................111 
 
 
 4 
List of Abbreviations1 
ADC  Anti-Discrimination Centre 
CDDHR Center for Development of Democracy and Human Rights 
CERP  Centre for Enlightenment and Research Programs 
CW  Citizens’ Watch 
ERC  Environmental Rights Centre 
FRS  Federal’naâ registracionnaâ služba (Federal Registration Service)2   
FSB  Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)  
GOST  Gosudarstvennyj standard (State Standard) 
GPI  Gosudarstvennaâ požarnaâ inspekciâ (State Fire Inspectorate)  
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
HRWF Human Rights without Frontiers 
ICNL  International Center for Not-for-profit Law 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
                                                 
1
 A short note regarding transliteration: Russian (and Ukrainian) words and phrases, personal names including informants 
and written sources in Russian language, are transcribed using the ISO 9 (1995) transliteration system for Romanization of 
Cyrillic letters (identical to the GOST (2002) system). Unlike the alternative systems, words transliterated with this system 
can be traced back to its exact source as each Cyrillic letter is given a one-character equivalent. Readers not familiar with 
Russian will find the names hard to pronounce correctly, but the provided preciseness for academic reference is 
uncontested. Russian authors of English texts and names of persons quoted in written sources are both transliterated as in 
the text referred to. 
2
 Also known as Rosregistraciâ. 
 5 
Acknowledgments 
I am grateful to my informants who shared their expertise and personal experiences with me. 
I have also incurred debt to a range of other human rights workers who shared their field 
knowledge and guided me through unknown territory. Special thanks to Elena Kobets and 
ERC Bellona who let me use their premises in St. Petersburg for interviews and 
correspondence. 
Furthermore, I am grateful to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for 
financial support and for providing me with an office among wonderful academics. 
Especially, I am indebted to Helge Blakkisrud, Heidi Kjærnet and Indra Øverland for letting 
their academic insights benefit my thesis. Without the assistance of the NUPI library staff I 
would certainly have been busier these months. I thank my advisor Pål Kolstø at the 
University of Oslo for all his comments and patience. For editorial support, I am also 
indebted to Hedda Hakvåg, Jon Bækken and Christopher Pedersen Cook. 
Special thanks to Una Hakvåg for persistent support and sound advice. 
 
 6 
1. Introduction 
Being secondary to political forces, law in Russia long ago acquired an 
instrumental character. It was used as a tool of the political leadership, for 
social engineering, for education, for moral instruction, for legitimisation of 
policies, for whatever task the rulers might choose – but never for creating a 
rule of law and not of men.3 
       Marina Kurkchyian 
Rule of law is more than a principle of governance. According to Lon Fuller, it is a moral 
good.4 Although citizens in rule of law states may consider some regulations burdensome 
and bureaucratic, the legal system enjoys a relatively high level of respect and trust. The 
citizens recognize that some tax payers dodge regulations by manipulating existing 
incentives. Yet, they believe that the law is there first and foremost to protect their rights and 
regulate society for the common good. That law can be wielded selectively for extra-legal 
purposes is an uncommon thought in rule of law states. 
As Marina Kurkchyian’s above statement above tells us, Russians have different experiences 
with law. In hybrid or authoritarian regimes, law can serve many purposes other than 
protecting the citizens’ legal rights. Although the law also serves this purpose to some 
degree, the Russian legal system is often manipulated to promote a variety of informal 
interests – be it personal, economic, or political. I term this phenomenon selective law 
enforcement, my main theoretical concept in this thesis. In short, selective law enforcement 
is the selective pursuit of legally imposed punishment for personal or political ends.  
1.1 The Research Question 
My empirical field of research is the perceptions of political abuse of law against non-
governmental organization in Russia. The empirical research, however, refers closely to my 
                                                 
3
 Kurkciyan, Marina (2005): “Researching Legal Culture in Russia: From Asking the Question to Gathering the Evidence” 
in Banakar and Travers (eds.) (2005): Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research. Oxford: Hart, p. 266. 
4
 Fuller paraphrased in Tamanaha, Brian Z. (2004): On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 95. 
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more generic, theoretical discussion of selective law enforcement, an underdeveloped 
concept in existing literature. Because of the lack of an existing theoretical base, my 
approach is essentially explorative. The main research question I seek to explore is:  
How did selective law enforcement against Russian human rights organizations unfold from 
2006 through 2008? 
In the research, I seek to identify the phenomenon’s functioning and effect. The research also 
examines the purpose of selective law enforcement at a theoretical level. I do not, however, 
approach the intentions behind selective law enforcement empirically.  
Since this thesis is but a first venture into a large field, I will refine the initial concept of 
selective law enforcement along the way. In other words, I intend to explore the concept’s 
validity while keeping it open for change. Throughout the thesis, the answer to the primary 
research question is obtained through a dialogue between the initial theoretical model and the 
empirical research. I aim to achieve insight on the unfolding of selective law enforcement in 
both its case-specific and theoretical context. 
1.2 Operationalization of the Research Question 
In the below theoretical model, I underline the necessity of looking into the interrelations 
between the formal and informal parts of selective law enforcement – the need to look at the 
mechanism as a complex whole. In order to investigate how selective law enforcement has 
unfolded empirically, however, it proved necessary to operationalize the main question and 
investigate the formal and informal separately.  
To operationalize a concept is “to identify those variables in terms of which the phenomenon 
represented by the concept can be accurately observed”.5 To structure my empirical research 
of selective law enforcement against Russian human rights organizations, I operate with the 
following four variables:  
                                                 
5
 Greenwood, Ernest (1956): "New Directions in Delinquency Research: A Commentary on a Study by Bernard Lander," 
Social Service Review, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 152.  
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(1) The legal foundation for selective law enforcement 
(2) The punishment imposed through selective law enforcement  
(3) The extra-legal criteria the punished actors perceive to be behind the punishment  
(4) Perceptions regarding the informal rules’ origins and means of communication. 
The relevance of the variables is explained in chapter 3. 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
This first chapter provides first formulates a broad question forming the foundation for an 
explorative study into selective law enforcement. Second, the chapter operationalizes the 
research question and identifies some variables structuring the collection of empirical 
material. Following this general outline of the thesis structure, the chapter contextualizes the 
research and presents the most important secondary literature that I have utilized in the 
thesis. In a separate, albeit short second chapter, I discuss some relevant methodological 
issues. This chapter includes a presentation of the informants and some brief comments on 
the use of qualitative interviews in academic research. 
The third chapter first discusses two relevant lines of thought used to explain interrelations 
between formal and informal structures. These lines of thought form a loose base on which I 
form my own theoretical interpretation of selective law enforcement, introduced in the 
second part of the chapter. It is important to emphasize that this model is a theoretical 
construct – it does not aim to neatly fit every case of the phenomenon. I do hope, however, 
that it can provide a useful point of departure for understanding informal influence on legal 
systems. The model argues that selective law enforcement is characterized by the unique 
relationship between the informal interests and the formal law enforcement structures, 
resembling the relationship of a parasite to its host. Furthermore, the process of selective law 
enforcement can be distinguished by specific traits and purposes. Most importantly, the 
model seeks to describe how agents can apply formal legal structures to promote private or 
political interests.  
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In chapter 4, general theory gives way to more case-specific analysis. This chapter deals with 
the formal half of selective law enforcement, the Russian legal system. The discussion deals 
with the first two variables of selective law enforcement and thus investigates what 
characterizes the legal basis for selective law enforcement and which punishment is imposed 
selectively. First, I examine the formal regulation of NGOs with a particular focus on the 
2006 amendments to NGO legislation. Second, I present some specific legal cases, 
approached through interviews with Russian NGO staff who have personal experience with 
the issue at hand. The third section combines the findings from the two previous parts. Here, 
I present a typology of legal traits typical for selective law enforcement against NGOs, and 
discuss what kinds of punishment have been imposed. Even though the most severe 
sanctions were avoided by many of the informants’ NGOs, the damage done to the NGO 
community is considerable not least because of the indirect impact of the legal procedures.  
In chapter 5, I discuss the other half of selective law enforcement, being the informal rules 
and the agency behind them. I approach the material with the intent of discovering 
perceptions regarding the nature, origins and communication of the informal rules behind 
legal punishment. All my informants in some way or another depict ‘the authorities’ as the 
force behind selective law enforcement. Therefore, I introduce the chapter by presenting the 
informal pressure that Russian federal authorities place on the NGOs. Second, I redirect 
focus to my informants’ perceptions of informal processes behind the legal prosecution. The 
informal criteria the informants state as crucial to their legal problems coincide with the 
governmental rhetoric. Based on this, I discuss how selective law enforcement in the case of 
Russian NGOs works as a mechanism through which governmental policies are supported by 
a manipulative use of the legal system. This constitutes the third part of the chapter. 
Chapter 6 provides further analysis based on findings from the subsequent chapters. The first 
part deals with the informants’ insistence that the mechanism is a governmental tool of 
repression. I discuss how governments can potentially benefit from employing selective law 
enforcement as a means to control society, and how this fits the logic of hybrid regimes 
mimicking democracy. In the second part, I seek to explain selective law enforcement’s 
performance among the investigated cases, drawing on insight from of all four investigated 
variables. My research indicates that selective law enforcement against Russian NGOs first 
and foremost has been impeded by the relative inefficiency of the enforcement agencies. 
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key empirical and theoretical findings 
and suggesting directions for further research. 
1.4 Context 
1.4.1 Law in Russia’s Hybrid Regime 
The study of selective law enforcement is a study of how the state and its people relate to 
law. In case of selective law enforcement, the punished is not punished because of the law, 
but through the application of it. If the victims of selective law enforcement are indeed guilty 
of violating the law, is the punishment contradicting rule of law?  
The concept of rule of law is disputed. Various definitions focus on either form or content, 
means or ends. Is rule of law a moral good or a principle of governance? The minimum 
requirement according to all definitions is that the government does not rule in a completely 
arbitrary manner, but through the use of a formally codified set of rules. This is also known 
by the term rule by law. In a state based on rule by law, “there can be no criminal punishment 
without a pre-existing law that specified the action as prohibited”.6 Within just a concept of 
law, where it is seen as isolated from moral criteria, any kind of law can in principle be 
implemented. Rule by law is first and foremost “an instrument of governmental action”.7  
Tamanahan states: “formal legality has more in common with the idea of rule by law than the 
historical [morally defined] rule of law”.8 At first glance, therefore, selective law 
enforcement is founded on a system of rule by law – it adapts a purely formalistic view upon 
law while neglecting principles often associated with rule of law. Yet, this is only half the 
truth, because selective law enforcement is a phenomenon that plays upon the ambivalence 
and confusion surrounding these concepts. On the one hand, it adopts a formalistic view on 
                                                 
6
 Tamanaha (2004), p. 119. 
7
 Tamanaha (2004), p. 91. On the instrumental use of law, see also Galligan, Denis J. (2003): “Legal Failure: Law and 
Social Norms in Post-Communist Europe” in Galligan, Denis J. and Kurkchiyan, Marina  (2003): Law and Informal 
practices – The Post-Communist Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
8
 Tamanaha (2004), p. 96. 
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law to achieve informal ends. In this way selective law enforcement clearly operates within 
the logic of rule by law. On the other hand, it also implicitly demands the legitimacy 
associated with rule of law. It refers to law as the superior legitimate dictator whose rulings 
nobody is fit to criticize, thus at least partly legitimizing the selective law enforcement. This 
dual relationship between law and society is a commonplace phenomenon within hybrid 
regimes. In this way, the regimes can utilize seemingly democratic institutions for 
legitimacy, while simultaneously making room for authoritarian repression. This research 
will demonstrate that selective law enforcement can be a way to promote undemocratic goals 
within the constraints of formal democracy. 
1.4.2 Some Relevant Discourses 
The Academic Discourse on Authoritarian Legal Systems 
My contribution in the theoretical field finds its empirical basis within a specific context, 
being the formal legal system and the informal interests manipulating it. The presented 
research relates to the debate on the relationship between law and society in hybrid regimes 
in general and in Russia in particular. Through my research, I hope to contribute to our 
knowledge on how law functions in Russia. However, the analytical parts of the thesis 
interpret the findings in more theoretical terms to underscore its potential value also outside 
the Russian context. 
Regarding the study of legal systems in authoritarian regimes, the collected articles in Rule 
by Law, edited by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, provide an interesting mix of research 
from various empirical contexts.9 For the academic discourse of law and society in Russia, 
Ruling Russia edited by William Alex Pridemore, Law and Informal Practices edited by 
Denis J. Galligan and Marina Kurckchyian and Russia, Europe and the Rule of Law edited 
by Ferdinand Feldbrugge, all provide broad approaches.10 A recurring contributor to these 
                                                 
9
 Ginsburg and Moustafa  (2008) Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
10
 Pridemore, William Alex (ed.) (2005): Ruling Russia – Law, Crime, and Justice in a Changing Society. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Galligan, Denis J. and Kurkchiyan, Marina (eds.) (2003): Law and Informal practices - 
the Post-Communist Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feldbrugge, Ferdinand (ed.) (2007): Russia, Europe, 
and the Rule of Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
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academic debates is Peter H. Solomon Jr., whose works on the Russian and Soviet legal 
systems have been published since the 1970s. 
The Theoretical Discourse on Informality 
With regard to the theoretical model of selective law enforcement, my research draws mainly 
upon Alena Ledeneva’s discussions on informal economics and various works of new 
institutionalism dealing with informal institutions. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky 
accredit Guillermo O’Donnell for initiating the discourse on informal institutions in the 
1990s.11 With the third wave of democratization, it became clear that concepts of formal 
institutions alone are inadequate in explaining various aspects of democratic progress within 
the post-communist world and elsewhere. Today, how informal structures shape political 
systems is still a field of research inadequately studied. Nevertheless, several prominent 
scholars theorize on these issues. In this thesis I refer amongst others to works of Helmke 
and Levitsky, Keith Darden, Hans-Joachim Lauth and Christopher Stefes. 
The Discourse on Russian NGO Legislation 
Alfred B. Evans Jr., co editor of the book Russian Civil Society, finds that “the coverage of 
civil society in Russia has been very one-sided during recent years” and that “many Western 
sources have equated civil society in Russia with human rights organizations, neglecting to 
mention the activity of many other types of organizations that have a broader base of 
support”.12 The NGOs Evans refers to have showed a remarkable ability to attract the 
attention from of press, international organizations and academics alike. Evans also suggests 
that “the Western coverage of recent legislation on NGOs in Russia has been one-sided and 
has not considered the experience of all organizations”.13 I hereby add myself to the list of 
sinners. I do not, however, confuse my study of selective law enforcement with civil society 
                                                 
11
 Helmke and Levitsky (2003). p. 4. The paper they refer to is O’Donnell, Guillermo (1996): “Another Institutionalization: 
Latin America and Elsewhere” Kellogg Institute Working Paper #222, March, 1996. 
12
 Evans, A. (2009): “Comment on civil society” in Johnson Russia List #19 - JRL 2009-32. Available at 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-32-19.cfm, accessed March 30, 2009. For a broader approach to Russian civil 
society see the edited volume Evans, Alfred B Jr. et al.  (2006): Russian Civil Society – A Critical Assessment.  New York: 
M.E. Sharpe. 
13
 Evans, A. (2009). 
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issues. I have no intentions to describe Russian civil society. Instead, my aim is to investigate 
informal aspects of the Russian legal system. 
In chapter 4, I review the new NGO-law of 2006 and the criticism it was subjected to both 
before and after its implementation. This discourse has been dominated by the NGOs 
themselves, both in Russia and abroad, and my review therefore builds upon literature the 
may be politically motivated. This certainly poses serious methodological challenges, but 
granted the focus of the thesis they are hard to avoid. The debate on Russian NGO legislation 
is marked by the fact that the foremost Russian experts on judicial issues to a large degree 
are involved in the conflict themselves. My research also suggests that this double role 
influences the outcome of the conflict, as the NGOs by virtue of their legal expertise are able 
to successfully defend themselves in court. 
The most thorough project on the legal situation of Russian NGOs was completed in 2008 by 
the Russian organization AGORA and its partners. The project concluded with the 
publication of the book Nepravitel’stvennye: Desâtiletie Vyživaniâ (Non-governmentals: A 
Decade of Survival). At the beginning of 2009, Nepravitel’stvennye was arguably the main 
Russian publication on this field.14 Other and more brief reports typically make an analysis 
of relevant legislation, document individual cases of illegitimate persecution. The Russian 
organizations also often make recommendations to Russian political decision-makers in their 
reports. Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Helsinki Group Moscow (HGM), Human Rights 
without Frontiers (HRWF), and various Russian joint projects are among the contributors to 
this documentation process.15 Reports with a strong focus on the NGO-law of 2006, that also 
I give a lion’s share of the attention, often base their legal interpretation on the American 
NGO International Center for Not-for-profit Law’s (ICNL) analysis from the same year. The 
ICNL’s interpretation therefore strongly influenced the discourse on the law, especially in 
2006 and 2007, before reports on actual implementation gradually increased in volume. 
My review of the reports suggests that there is not much real debate within the NGO 
community regarding the NGO-law, as the reports for the most part state the same 
                                                 
14
 In footnotes and the literature list referred to as Ahmetgaliev et al. (2008): Nepravitel’stvennye: Desâtiletie Vyživaniâ. 
Kazan: Otečestvo. 
15
 For a more comprehensive list, see footnote 83 
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arguments. Also, they often refer to the same sources. Many statements should therefore be 
considered more or less as the collective opinion in the community. In my footnotes I often 
refer to these general statements as “inter alia” while a full list of sources applied in the 
review on the NGO law are listed in footnote 83. 
The Internationalized Civil Society 
Although admittedly not a vital part of my research, I hope to balance my focus on the 
NGOs’ stories somewhat by stressing the fact that every conflict has two sides. The 
Kremlin’s sceptical attitude towards Western-oriented NGOs has not appeared out of thin 
air. Rather, it is a product of both internal developments in Russia and ongoing global 
processes. The conflict between the Western-oriented human rights NGOs and the Russian 
state can largely be explained by the expansion of Western influence into the post-Soviet 
realm. If a conflict is to be solved, the best approach comes through an understanding of the 
interests of both sides. The parts in conflicts, however, tend to forget this basic knowledge. 
Apart from speeches and statements of the Russian authorities, my discussion on Kremlin 
policies in chapter 5 refers to several critical analyses of Western financial support of NGOs. 
I build my interpretation of the international context on the works of amongst others Sarah 
Henderson, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Kim Reimann and Aleksandra Chauhan.  
 15 
2. Method and Methodological Issues 
In this thesis, I apply primary research data from interview material gathered from April to 
December 2008 and contextualize the findings through secondary literature. The theoretical 
model is built on secondary literature as well as the findings of my own research. 
The research is qualitative, although I will not completely ignore apparent patterns. I leave 
for others, however, to verify their existence through a more quantitative approach, and to 
give a more comprehensive analysis of the overall impact of the phenomenon.  
Although statistical correlations in quantitative studies may reveal traces of selective law 
enforcement, it is primarily a phenomenon in the mind – a game of intentions and 
perceptions. I have chosen to investigate the latter aspect, my mode of presentation relating 
closely to the informants’ stories. For gathering quantifiable data such as the number of times 
each paragraph has been applied, this method would clearly be suboptimal had the goal been 
to obtain hard facts. Granted the essentially subjective nature of the phenomenon at hand, 
however, I want to display the informants’ perceptions in light of their own interpretation of 
the formal prosecution.  
In chapter 3, I argue that selective law enforcement is a process initiated informally and 
concluded with formal punishment. In the research, these processes are traced back through 
the informants’ perceptions of the events. Although I sought to triangulate the NGO 
dominated discourse and the informants’ answers with academic references and 
governmental statements, readers should be aware of possible bias. Given the selection of 
sources and my qualitative approach to the phenomenon, the research is not based on raw 
facts exclusively. Rather I display fiction ‘based on a true story’. Thus, I adopt Paul 
Rosenblatt’s view as a point of departure: “I can get closer to whatever is ‘right’ by hearing 
what people have to say”.16 As Rosenblatt, “I hope to write truth, not the truth, but certainly a 
truth”.17 
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 Rosenblatt, Paul C. (2002): “Interviewing at the Border of Fact and Fiction” in Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. 
(eds.) (2002): Handbook of Interview Research: Context & Method. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 894. 
17
 Rosenblatt (2002), p. 905. Emphasis in original. 
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2.1 Selection of Empirical Data 
The Informants 
My research draws on qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with ten Russian NGO 
representatives working on topics related to human and civil rights. That said, their fields of 
work vary considerably. Anti-discrimination, environmental rights and freedom of the press 
are among the topics on the various NGOs’ agendas. The case of the European University of 
St. Petersburg was included because a study program on democratic elections was perceived 
to be the reason for the prosecution. 
Sorted alphabetically by surname, the interviewed informants are:  
Tatâna Barandova, PhD-student and former unofficial leader of the protests against the 
closure of the European University of St. Petersburg (EUSPB); Elena Žemkova, member of 
the board of the International Association “Memorial” and executive director of its Moscow 
office; Ûrij Džibladze, president of the Center for the Development of Democracy and 
Human Rights (CDDHR); Mariâ Kanevskaâ, head of the Centre for Enlightenment and 
Research Programs (CERP); Ol’ga Krivonos, lawyer at the Environmental Rights Centre 
Bellona (ERC Bellona); Stefaniâ Kulaeva, Head of the Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial 
(ADC Memorial); Anna Šarogradskaâ, head of the Regional Press Institute (RPI); Maksim 
Timofeev, lawyer at Citizens’ Watch (CW); Natal’â Taubina, director of Public Verdict; as 
well as an NGO leader, president of an interregional NGO, rendered anonymous at the 
author’s discretion. 
Most of the informants had personally experienced legal prosecution which they believed 
was influenced by their non-compliance with informal rules. A few others were included for 
their expertise on the legal situation of Russian NGOs in general and of human rights NGOs 
in particular. Note that nepravitelstvennye organizacii (non-governmental organizations) do 
not constitute a legal category in Russia. Russian legislation operates with the categories 
obŝestvennye ob”edineniâ (public associations) and nekommerčeskie organizacii (non-
commercial organizations) – as well as several subcategories. My use of the term NGO 
encompasses all these legal categories, as does the NGO-law of 2006 and most of the debate 
regarding Russian NGOs.  
 17 
This study utilizes a relatively low number of informants, and they represent only a small 
group of NGOs. It should be emphasized that these people are not typical representatives of 
Russian civil society. They can, however, be considered a fair sample of Western-oriented, 
professional, resourceful NGOs from Moscow and St. Petersburg, dealing with topics 
considered suspicious by authorities. The informants find themselves in the somewhat 
contradictory position of being marginalized elites; they possess considerable financial and 
mental resources but claim to be more or less cut off from decision-making regarding their 
vital interests.18 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in the informants’ working environments. 
Furthermore, many of the informants head an organization or one of its local branches, which 
are relatively small. Although I did ask for personal opinions, granted the setting and the 
informants’ positions within the organizations, I do not expect the answers to deviate 
significantly from the NGOs official points of view.19 
Why This Selection? 
I intentionally focus on the more well-known cases of prosecution in order to gain insight 
into processes of selective law enforcement in a highly politicized climate. I choose to 
investigate the conflict at its peak, where the political lines of conflict are crystallized. The 
cases have drawn significant attention from the international NGO-community, activists, 
mass media and academics both in Russia and abroad. Therefore, one can assume that there 
have been considerable efforts to enforce the informal rules and that the NGOs have had a 
strong interest in defending their organizations against punishment. In short, in a highly 
politicized climate less is left to chance. As discussed below, the geographical focus on 
Russia’s two main cities magnifies these traits. 
The selected group of informants share traits aggressively criticized by the Kremlin. In 1999, 
all NGOs operating in Russia were obliged to remove “protection of human rights” and 
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 For a discussion on how to identify and classify elite groups, see Odendahl, Teresa and Shaw, Aileen M. (2002): 
“Interviewing Elites” in Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. (eds.) (2002): Handbook of Interview Research: Context 
& Method. Thosand Oaks: Sage Publications, especially p. 301-303. The group of informants in this study arguably share 
some traits with strategic, professional and philanthropic elites within various classifications. 
19
 A possible exception to this rule is the case of the European University of St. Petersburg (EUSBP). 
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“protection of citizens’ rights” from their organizations’ goals. The government stated that 
according to the constitution, only the state and professional lawyers were allowed to protect 
these rights in the Russian Federation.20 Furthermore, the Kremlin has repeatedly criticized 
NGOs dependent on foreign funding, as will be elaborated below. The informants’ NGOs 
have a rather international profile, receive foreign funding and often have English web-
pages. As will be seen, the Kremlin depicts them as bridgeheads for expanding Western 
interests, while the NGOs see themselves as frontline defenders against governmental 
repression of the freedom of association. 
In this environment, selective law enforcement exists in its most identifiable form. I regard 
this to be advantageous, as the research is an initial study of the phenomenon and aim to 
develop a generic theoretical model of its structure. Furthermore, the informants are 
outspoken and have more or less chosen to make their cases public, speaking openly of 
sensitive issues in the midst of growing authoritarianism. As they did not demand anonymity, 
the research becomes easier to test and verify. 
The NGOs’ Geographical Location 
Since the informants’ NGOs are all located in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the findings are 
not necessarily valid for other parts of Russia. The geographical focus is primarily chosen for 
practical reasons as most Western-oriented Russian NGOs are located in these two cities. 
When interpreting the implications of the findings for other parts of Russia, one should 
consider the following: 
Firstly, the NGOs are probably better protected in these two cities than elsewhere. They can 
support each other more easily; more skilled lawyers reside here and it is easier to attract 
international attention. Several informants and observers emphasize that NGOs in the 
periphery have more problems in defending themselves against legal prosecution than the 
ones in the main cities.21 At the same time, the power vertical of the Kremlin is less stretched 
in these cities than in the Russian periphery. I assume that the informal interests of the local 
leadership and/or business elite have less influence where the federal leadership’s presence is 
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strong. This is self-evident in the capital. With regard to St. Petersburg, the city is not only 
the second largest in Russia both in terms of population and political significance, but also 
the city of origin for most of the political leadership in Russia today. In short, the two major 
cities of Russia are where both the NGOs and the federal leadership have their strongest 
bases. 
The Timeframe 
My choice to investigate the selective law enforcement’s unfolding from 2006 through 2008   
is not coincidental. The period carries great significance for Russian NGOs with regard to 
their legal environment. Džibladze identifies chronologically differentiated periods when 
different state agencies have taken care of the official punishment of NGOs. Before 2005, the 
main responsibility for “harassment and selective prosecution” belonged to the tax 
authorities, he states. The FSB, Russia’s security service, also played an important role in the 
background, but were seldom directly involved in the formal procedures.22 With the 
implementation of a new NGO-law in 2006, the landscape changed. The Federal Registration 
Service (FRS), a state agency established in 2005 and responsible for implementing much of 
the NGO legislation, now played the leading role in regulating NGO activity. 
The deadline for data collection was set at the end of 2008.23 Not only was this date set due 
to the project’s deadline, but the year also marked a significant change in the legal 
environment of the Russian NGOs. The summer of 2008, only a few months after the 
presidential power was handed over to Dmitrij Medvedev, the FRS’ duties regarding NGOs, 
together with much of the personnel, were transferred to the NGO-department of the 
Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, the NGOs experienced a period of “some kind of 
liberalisation”.24 Time will show if this was just an interim period before the conflict again 
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begins to gather momentum. Towards the end of 2008 there were some “individual cases of 
crackdown”, states one of the informants, but no systematic persecution like earlier.25 
2.2 Using Interviews in Academic Research 
My primary tool to get fresh insight into processes of selective law enforcement was in-
depth-interviews with experts on – and representatives of – the NGO-community in Russia. 
Given the nature of the third and fourth variable and the importance of perceptions in this 
regard, it was critical to get as close to first-hand experience of selective law enforcement as 
possible. Answers regarding perceptions of informal processes can only be discovered by 
listening to the personal interpretations of the involved. 
Interviews can provide a source to new and unpublished information; the acquired material is 
by its very nature highly subjective but therefore also unique. Through interviews researchers 
do not only gain access to the informants’ knowledge, but also to their “interior 
experiences”.26 This creates exclusive possibilities for investigating informal phenomena 
such as selective law enforcement. For selective law enforcement’s functioning with regard 
to deterrence, I will argue that the perceptions of the punished are crucial. 
One of the main challenges of academic research in general, and of qualitative interviews in 
particular, is to deal with the degree to which the researcher’s interpretation influences the 
outcome. As John Johnson puts it: “Children don’t learn what their parents tell them, but 
what they are prepared and ready to hear. The same holds for in-depth interviewers: They 
don’t necessarily ‘hear’ what their informants tell them, but only what their own intellectual 
and ethical development has prepared them to hear”.27 In an interpretive research approach, 
researchers acknowledge how subjectivity shapes the research project. 
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The debate on how the researcher should relate to the interviewee is marked by stark 
contrasts. Norman Denzin pleads for interviews “where the research interviewer not only 
self-consciously empathizes with the informants as individuals, but self-consciously 
sympathizes with the political or community goals of those informants as a category or 
collective”. 28 John Lofland, representing an opposite view, regards Denzin’s statement as 
promotion of “fettered research”. 29 I take a humble stand in the middle. I neither deny nor 
fight my sympathy for the promotion of human rights and democracy, and the influence of 
my own values on the research should not be ignored. At the same time, I maintain focus on 
findings I believe are of larger interest than my own feelings, sympathies or antipathies. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
To grasp the theoretical concept of selective law enforcement, a simple semantic analysis 
provides a good start. Simply put, selective law enforcement consists of selectivity, law 
enforcement, and the interaction between the two. I operate with a division between 
formality and informality based on whether the interests, rules, punishment or other elements 
are officially codified or not. In selective law enforcement, selectivity constitutes the 
informal component and law enforcement the formal. A rule is informal if it does not refer to 
legal documents. Punishment is informal if it is not sanctioned by a legally constituted 
power. A governmental inspection of an NGO is provided for in official regulatory 
documents, and is thus formal. If the inspection is initiated for reasons not formally codified 
however, the selection is informal or based on informal criteria. As elaborated below, this is 
always the case in selective law enforcement as I define it. Nevertheless, the inspection itself 
remains formal.  
Informal rules can be enforced in many ways. If someone crosses the mafia in certain 
Hollywood movies, they might end up ‘sleeping with the fishes’. To be drowned for breaking 
the mafia code of silence is definitely an example of enforcement of informal rules, but not 
of selective law enforcement – at least not in the meaning discussed here. This is because 
selective law enforcement is a hybrid phenomenon, consisting of both formal and informal 
components. In the mafia example, the informal rules are enforced, but outside official 
channels. Here I exclusively discuss how informal rules are enforced through legal channels. 
Initially, I will discuss two different approaches to informality and its relationship with 
formal institutions.  First, I present and discuss theory on informal institutions developed by 
Hans-William Lauth, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky.30 Second, I will turn to Alena 
Ledeneva’s studies on informal practices in the Russian economy, transferring some of her 
concepts in informal economy to my own topic of interest. 
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Finally I present a concept of selective law enforcement that could be seen as an extension of 
these two sets of thoughts, adding supplementary comments and viewpoints. I argue that 
certain traits must be present for the practice of selective law enforcement to function and/or 
be institutionalized. I also argue that selective law enforcement has a specific purpose.  
3.1 A Discussion on Interrelations 
3.1.1 Selective Enforcement as Institutional Relations 
As a point of departure in grasping selective law enforcement theoretically, many of Hans-
Joachim Lauth’s thoughts seem useful. Lauth’s emphasis is on informal institutions and their 
relation to democratic development in transition systems. He starts his definitional 
expedition with defining informal institutions as “institutions which are not formally 
codified”.31 For an informal phenomenon to qualify as an institution, Lauth identifies some 
characteristics of systematization: 
Even if an actor does not wish to accept them, he or she obeys by them [sic], 
as in accordance with rational calculation, the costs involved in rejecting 
them can only be offset when real behavioural alternatives are available […] 
Despite their unofficial nature, informal institutions can be precisely 
understood and described at the analytical level, as they manifest their own 
functioning logics and rules of identity, which distinguishes them from others.  
[…] The definition of ‘functioning logic’ or ‘rule of identity’ is based on the 
idea that the following criteria are present in a specific form and inner 
connexion: First they have to be recognized by certain symbols or elements, 
that indicate their existence. Second, they are given specific forms of 
interconnection or interaction. Third, each institution is linked with a special 
purpose, which allows its functional description.32 
To secure obedience, informal institutions “are linked to sanctions”.33 This differentiates 
them in Lauth’s typology from cultural patterns and informal politics not expressed through 
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institutions.34 Lauth conceptualizes political institutions as a distinct category, stating that 
they ”derive their status as political institutions from their reference to binding decisions, 
themselves guaranteed by the legally constituted power”.35 Lauth divides relationships 
between formal and informal institutions into three categories; the complementary type, 
where the institutions support each other, the substitutive type, when the informal does what 
the formal fails to do, and the conflictive type, “when the two systems of rules are 
incompatible”.36 
A Typology of Interrelations  
Democratic legal systems formally build on principles of rule of law, typically formulated in 
the constitutions and in democratic conventions. The notion of selective law enforcement is 
in direct opposition to the principles of rule of law.37 In Lauth’s terminology, it interferes 
with the formal institution’s “functioning logic”.38 To deal with interrelations in cases where 
the sets of rules are incompatible, Lauth introduces the notion of parasitic institutions. These 
exist at the expense of formal institutions by “partially occupying or penetrating them”.39 
Selective law enforcement typically undermines the principles of rule of law by digging 
exceptional channels for the introduction of personally or politically motivated legality. This 
leads to a lack of trust in the democratic institution and as a consequence undermines the 
institution itself, as it is based on trust and common acceptance.  
Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky present a typology of relations between formal and 
informal institutions based on Lauth’s division. The first dimension in Helmke and 
Levitsky’s typology is the effectiveness of formal institutions. The second dimension is 
whether the goals of formal and informal institutions are in conflict or harmony. Based on 
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these two dimensions, Helmke and Levitsky identify four kinds of informal institutions: 
complementing, accommodating, substitutive, and competing (table 1).  
 Effective formal inst. Ineffective formal inst. 
Compatible goals Complementary Substitutive 
Conflicting goals Accommodating Competing 
Table 1: Typology of informal institutions in Helmke and Levitsky (2003) 
I will for now accept the premise that selectivity in law enforcement indeed constitutes an 
informal institution, although I will operate with another terminology below. The 
phenomenon undermines the legal system’s intentions to be a democratic institution. In this 
way it seems parasitic, exploiting and “partly occupying” the legal system.40 Moreover, its 
very existence is based on weak formal regulation and the rule of law malfunctioning. This is 
a central point in Ledeneva (see below) as well as the backbone of my own research. With 
regard to the above typology, this will indicate selectivity to be a competing informal 
institution, as it is in conflict with the formal democratic goals of the legal institutions and 
dependent on their weakness. 
Yet, while selectivity is negotiated informally, law enforcement follows legal procedures and 
is thus dependent on the formal institutions’ effectiveness to hand out legal punishment. Due 
to its dependence on a legal framework of sanctioning, the institution of informal selection 
can never be more effective than the law enforcement agencies’ ability to enforce the 
selection through punishment. These complex relations with formal institutions are not as 
paradoxical as they might seem, though they do reveal some shortcomings in Helmke and 
Levitsky’s typology as selective law enforcement hardly fits in. Informal selectivity in law 
enforcement relates closely to at least two formal institutions. On the one hand it depends on 
the malfunctioning of rule of law the principle of legal egalitarianism.41 On the other hand it 
is also dependent on the effectiveness of law enforcement, that is. the ability to meet non-
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compliance with relevant sanctions. In conceptualizing selective law enforcement, we have 
to take its dual nature into accord. 
The dual nature in the relationship between formal and informal elements validates the use of 
Lauth’s metaphor of a parasite. Selectivity in law enforcement is parasitic in its relationship 
to the formal legal system, since it weakens it but at the same time depends upon it entirely. 
Because the informal parasite has no sanctioning possibility of its own, it attaches itself to 
the formal institutions’ monopoly on violence. 
3.1.2 Selective Law Enforcement as Informal Practice  
Alena Ledeneva’s work is concerned with informal phenomena in the Russian economy.42 
As will be argued, however, her research can also provide valuable insight into the dynamics 
of politically motivated selective law enforcement. 
Ledeneva distinguishes between institutions and practices, where institutions provide the 
rules of the game and practices are the players’ strategies within them.43 Developed to fit her 
empirical studies, Ledeneva’s main theoretical tool to explain informal phenomena is 
informal practice, which she defines as the “outcome of players’ creative handling of formal 
rules and informal norms”.44 Thus, she discusses the interrelations between the formal and 
informal foundations of these practices. Informal practices are all about how to avoid the 
damaging effects of weak formal institutional framework, while making the best of the 
possibilities this weakness creates.45 Ledeneva investigates those informal practices that 
“infringe on, penetrate, and exploit formal organizations” – practices that parallel Lauth’s 
definition of parasitic institution.46 For Ledeneva, informal practices are equally rooted in 
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informal norms and formal rules, and function as bridges between the two as they “both 
compensate for defects in the formal order while simultaneously undermine it”.47 
Ledeneva’s approach differs from Lauth, Helmke and Levitsky. First, Ledeneva’s focus is on 
the outcome of her own empirical investigations and not based on any broader typology like 
Helmke and Levitsky above. Second, she focuses on strategies, not on the rules themselves. I 
will, however, look at what role the formal and informal rules play in Ledeneva’s model, 
develop these insights, and apply them to my own area of research. 
In Ledeneva’s model, laws, or the lack of them, play an important role. Few countries have 
developed more legislation in shorter time than post-communist Russia. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russians found themselves in a legal vacuum at the beginning of the 
1990s. From that time onwards, however, decrees and resolutions poured into the legal 
system at an impressive rate. The number of administrative regulations and standards was 
estimated at 25,000 already at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency.48 Ledeneva 
identifies the “legislation designed to improve the political and economic order in Russia, 
and the loopholes in its formulation and enforcement” as one of two “fundamental sets of 
factors to explain why informal practices are so prevalent in Russia”.49 The weak legislation 
provides a basis for pervasive non-compliance and thus the phenomenon of suspended 
punishment: 
The incoherence of formal rules compels almost all Russians, willingly or 
unwillingly, to violate them and to play by rules introduced and negotiated 
outside formal institutions […] Because of the pervasiveness of rule violation, 
punishment is bound to occur selectively on the basis of criteria developed 
outside the legal domain. While everybody is under the threat of punishment, 
the actual punishment is ‘suspended’ but can be enforced at any time.50  
These phrases are central to my understanding of selective law enforcement. By providing 
laws according to which everyone can be found guilty, legislation opens the door to informal 
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manipulation. When everyone is liable for punishment, it “becomes a resource in short 
supply”. 51 Its actual implementation and enforcement are left to negotiations on the informal 
market.52 In this way, non-compliance with informal rules can be punished by enforcing 
written ones, and it becomes necessary to comply with informal rules to avoid formal 
punishment.53 Herein lays a key to my theoretical understanding of selective law 
enforcement. 
Informal practices exist in every society, but the chasm they have to bridge naturally varies 
with the distance between formal rules and informal norms. In Ledeneva’s words: “informal 
practices predominate (or even become indispensable) where formal rules and informal 
norms are not synchronized”.54 In Russian legal culture, formal legality (zakonnost’) has 
never been considered equal to moral justice (spravedlivost’).55 The response to this 
“structural pressure” is a widespread use of informal practices in Russian society.56  
For the subjects to adapt to a second set of rules, however, there has to be a certain common 
recognition of the informal rules relevant for the subjects’ activities.57 Punishment will not 
work as a deterrent without some perception of what rules that have been violated. This 
certainly demands a degree of institutionalization of the perception of informal rules, their 
communication and their enforcement.58 
If there is no recognition of the link between non-compliance and punishment, the 
mechanism will not work as a deterrent. To use Lauth’s terminology, we can say that the 
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mechanism is based on a threat perception:  “Such a type of influence founded on force does 
not manifest itself through the use of force alone, whichever way this may be communicated. 
What is required is the development of an identifiable form of interaction […] which 
involves fixed roles and its own functioning logic”.59  The perennial threat of punishment in 
Russian business is what Ledeneva call suspended punishment above. In my empirical 
studies presented below, the enforcement agencies have already prosecuted some alleged 
violations by the NGOs. Following Ledeneva’s model and our informants’ perceptions of 
selective law enforcement, these subjects of prosecution have not taken the informal rules 
into proper consideration and willingly or unwillingly violated them. 
Included in Ledeneva’s listing of the most prominent informal practices is kompromat. 
Kompromat is by Akos Szilagyi defined as “the publication (or blackmail with the threat of 
publication) [of various compromising material] that can destroy or neutralize political 
opponents or business competitors”.60 In our case, the exposure, or (threat of exposure) of 
legal infringements can be used to enforce the informal rules. 
Selective law enforcement differs somewhat from kompromat, however. In the case of 
kompromat the material can either prove or hint towards non-compliance with common 
norms (incompetence, sexual deviance, ideological deviance) or formal rules (economic or 
other).61 If no such material is found, it can be fabricated. While kompromat can include any 
kind of compromising material, selective law enforcement depends on legally relevant 
material. This is of course linked to selective law enforcement being a phenomenon that 
exclusively applies legal processes to achieve informal ends. Formal punishment can be a 
consequence of kompromat, but it is not required.62 
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In a survey done by the Levada Centre, 92% of Russians believe that law enforcement is 
selective.63 In Transparency International’s index on perception of corruption by public 
officials and politicians in 2008, Russia scored 2.1 on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 
(highly corrupt).64 This is notably the same rating as on a corresponding list based on 
interviews from the late 1990s.65 Given that Russian citizens are aware of the fundamental 
shortcomings of rule of law, I expect them to base their actions on this knowledge, according 
to rational choice assumptions. 
3.2 Selective Law Enforcement – A Theoretical Model 
3.2.1 Selective Law Enforcement as a Complex Institution 
In biology, parasites cannot be understood without a firm knowledge of the host, but even 
knowledge of both parasite and host is insufficient to understand their relationship, which is 
arguably what is most interesting. Similarly, the phenomenon of selective enforcement 
cannot be understood properly without looking at the coexistence and reciprocity of legal 
institutions and informal practices. The theoretical perspectives of Lauth, Ledeneva and 
others provide some valuable theoretical insights on how to understand selective law 
enforcement, but here a more specific description is needed.  
As explained above, Lauth, Helmke, and Levitsky keep formal and informal institutions 
clearly differentiated conceptually. At the same time Lauth states that informal institutions 
relate to formal institutions and “are linked to sanctions”. 66 Christopher H. Stefes views an 
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institution as “a set of formal and informal rules and norms”.67 This opens for a more 
complex definition of institution that may fit our topic better than Lauth’s. Rather than being 
two or more institutions linked together by patterns of expectations and practice, the 
phenomenon of selective enforcement can be considered an institution in itself. As the 
argument goes, there is more to the concept than parallel formal and informal institutions. It 
is the unique interrelations between these parts that constitute the phenomenon’s 
“functioning logic”.68 Therefore, the whole is to be considered more than the sum of its 
components and should be addressed accordingly. 
A third alternative would be to do as Ledeneva and focus on selective enforcement as 
informal practice and thus reject its existence as an institution. In this line of though, it can 
be argued that the phenomenon does not constitute the “rules of the game” but rather actors’ 
strategies to manipulate the rules in their own interest.69 Still, when this practice evolves into 
patterns, it is not so much about “improvisation” or “creative handling”, as Ledeneva defines 
it – but rather about going with the flow. At one point, practices form a pattern that 
reproduces itself, thus creating predictability and structuring social interaction – precisely 
what we would identify as an institution. Ledeneva’s sharp division between strategies and 
institutions does not necessarily make sense in all contexts. In the case of selective law 
enforcement, I treat the practice as an institution. 
For the purpose of conceptualizing selective law enforcement, I therefore find the second of 
the discussed alternatives as a reasonable point of departure. I operate with selective law 
enforcement as a complex institution, building on Stefes’ definition of an institution as “a set 
of formal and informal rules and norms that ‘structure the relationship between individuals in 
various units”.70  
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3.2.2 The Functioning Logic of Selective Law Enforcement 
The mechanism of selective law enforcement is an institutionalized practice, a practice that 
has developed into an institution. Selective law enforcement is not just individual cases of 
manipulating the legal system. Rather, it but takes place systematically and according to 
certain patterns. Selective law enforcement has a purpose and involves beneficiaries and 
losers.  
Considerable power is needed to access the formal enforcement apparatus at higher levels. 
Selective law enforcement is a top-down mechanism that underpins the informal interests of 
those yielding such power. At the other end of the table, whoever crosses these interests risks 
being punished for their opposition, making it a less attractive option. The mechanism is also 
undermining rule of law itself, not only in the actual cases of selective law enforcement, but 
also through undermining the popular trust in legal systems already struggling for legitimacy. 
This kind of selectivity goes against the very basics of rule of law. 
Most importantly, selective law enforcement is a mechanism for enforcing informal rules, in 
a broad meaning of the word. By enforcement, I mean supporting the rules by punishing non-
compliance with them. In other words, enforcement is the link between rules and 
punishment. 
Informal Penetration into the Formal Enforcement Structure 
In the above ‘sleeping with the fishes’ example, the mafia structure enforces an informal rule 
through an informal channel. The punishment is also informal. Correspondingly, we can 
imagine a criminal being arrested by the police and sentenced to jail. In these two examples 
the enforcement structures are clearly separated (Fig1). 
When selective law enforcement takes place, however, the division between the two 
enforcement structures is less clear. In other words, the informal interests challenge the formal 
prerogative to decide what is punishable within the state. This can only happen if the formal 
structure is weak, as a strong formal structure is by definition exactly that – formal.71 In the 
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mechanism of selective law enforcement, informal rules penetrate the formal enforcement 
structure and make use of its formal sanctioning apparatus (Fig2). 
Informal norms
Informal punishment
Informal enforcement 
agencies
Formal rules
Formal enforcement 
agencies
Formal punishment
 
Figure 1: Division between formal and informal enforcement structures 
 
The phenomenon can also be explained in another way: in terms of interrelations between its 
formal and informal components, a specimen of selective law enforcement could be clearly 
identified chronologically with a head, a body, and a tail. The process is initiated informally 
and followed by a period of formal procedures with possible, and probable, informal 
manipulation. Finally, since the informal rules are enforced by employing the formal 
enforcement structure to impose legal punishment, the outcome is always formal. That 
selective enforcement has an informal head, however, does not imply that the formal rules are 
unimportant as a subject of discussion. As seen in Ledeneva, incoherent formal rules can 
provide a backdrop for informal practices.  
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As discussed below, the informal parasite is entirely dependent on the legal system. Selective 
law enforcement is characterized by its informal components’ dual relationship with formal 
institutions. In order to successfully pursue informal interests, selective law enforcement is 
on the one hand dependent on the weakness of rule of law – and is itself undermining it. On 
the other hand, the mechanism is equally dependent on the effectiveness of law enforcement.  
 
Figure 2: Informal penetration of the formal enforcement structure 
 
When the informal penetrates the formal enforcement structures, questions regarding legality 
become hard to determine. The practice of handing out official sanctions to punish violations 
of informal rules clearly contradicts the principles of rule of law, transparency and 
democracy. Yet, from a formalistic point of view, what could be more legal than punishment 
imposed by the legal system and formally based on legislation created by the highest 
authorized and elected organ of power? Within a formalistic conceptualization, an 
environmental activist jailed for extremism is just that - an extremist, as defined by the 
superior authority of the state. 
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Selectivity in Law Enforcement 
In a sense, law is enforced selectively in all societies, not least due to limitations in resources 
and/or information. The law’s main practical role is arguably not to punish everyone guilty of 
non-compliance, but rather to discipline the population by operating both as a norm-bearer, 
and as the legal basis of potential, yet often unrealized, sanctions. By exercising physical and 
moral authority, the legal system is intended to discipline the body and more ambitiously - 
the mind. 
To set examples in order to discipline others is of course common legal practice in every 
state, and the legitimacy of the practice is grounded in a supposedly unbiased selection of 
non-compliers to punish. In other words, there exists an official policy to regulate the 
selection. A typical criterion regulating selection is the degree of the violation, that is the 
violation’s graveness. Another vital criterion determining whom to punish relates to the 
access to resources and information. If the infringement is considered minor and the case is 
difficult to solve by investigation, the case will normally lose priority. When there is no 
penetration of informal rules into the formal enforcement structure, the balance between the 
goals and resources should be according to a formal policy which regulates the agency’s 
expenditures. 
Completely arbitrary prosecution may be considered another kind of law enforcement. 
Arbitrary prosecution, being prosecution without any underlying principle or logic, is by 
definition unbiased as it is completely random. Therefore, it creates an unpredictable legal 
environment. I choose to keep arbitrary law enforcement conceptually separated from 
selective law enforcement. For law enforcement to qualify as selective, I hold selection as a 
premise. This selection can be determined by formal or informal criteria, but it can by 
definition not be arbitrary in itself. 
It is when extra-legal criteria penetrate the legal environment, and the process of selection is 
non-transparent, that selective law enforcement appears in the form this thesis shows interest 
in. Penetration by extra-legal criteria implies that the basis for selectivity is negotiated 
outside official channels, and is not regulated in any official document. As mentioned, I look 
for selective pursuit of legally imposed punishment for personal or (informal) political ends. 
For a manipulator with sufficient power resources, the law does not have to be an obstacle to 
avoid. Rather, it could be a weapon to strike down enemies. In theory, the door is open for 
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anyone who can influence the law enforcement agencies, as long as the laws are incoherent 
and the democratic institutions malfunctioning. When the decision-making process is open to 
informal influence, everyone with relevant resources could participate in negotiations.  
Informal influence notwithstanding, negotiations must relate closely to the formal institutions 
responsible for imposing formal punishment. The goal of the negotiators will ultimately be to 
influence these agencies. Informal influence cannot be fully reserved for anyone, but the best 
cards in this game certainly belong to the executive authorities.72 
Deterrence Is of the Essence 
In 2008 Richard Macrory identified some guiding normative principles with regard to what 
the aims of sanctioning should be: While some of the principles are meant to ensure rule of 
law, at least two of them are valid also with regard to the self-interests of rule by law 
regimes. A sanction should: (1) “aim to change the behaviour of the offender”; (2) “aim to 
deter future non-compliance” by other subjects of legislation.73 I assume these principles of 
sanctioning will be equally valid for the enforcement of informal rules as for written ones. 
The credibility and long-term vitality of selective enforcement as a functioning tool of social 
engineering is certainly dependent on effective punishment, meaning effective deterrence 
against further non-compliance. 
Deterrence is a vital goal of enforcement, regardless of whether the rules to be enforced are 
formal or informal or whether the legal system is based on rule of law or not. Both Lauth’s 
threat perception and Ledeneva’s suspended punishment are mechanisms of deterrence. A 
punishment can sometimes physically bar the punished from further non-compliance. This is 
however a costly and inefficient way of enforcing rules, be it formal or informal. Regardless 
of whether the task is fighting crime or enforcing regulatory regimes, the deterring effect of 
the punishment is of vital importance. What Ledeneva wrote about suspended punishment in 
the Soviet era remains true for all kinds of regulatory measures: the goal is “to keep everyone 
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under self-control”.74 This way of enforcing compliance to informal rules is cost efficient 
with regard to both moral and physical resources. As Steven Lukes points out: “power is at 
its most effective when least observable”.75 
Deterrence in Selective Law Enforcement 
Deterrence, being a vital goal of punishment in modern societies, is dependent on 
expectations regarding non-compliance and punishment. The enforcers are expected to 
establish a firm connection between non-compliance and punishment in the minds of their 
subjects. It is not sufficient to hand out sanctions if the subjects are not aware of why they are 
punished. The reason for punishment needs to be communicated. If the informal rules have 
not been communicated properly, the subjects of punishment cannot be expected to change 
behaviour according to the punisher’s informal interests. 
In formal legal systems, the reasons for punishment are usually formulated by the court. In 
well-functioning legal systems, this will usually be a satisfactory explanation and the 
punished will therefore usually link her punishment to a formal rule. Importantly, the same 
would be true for the other subjects of legislation (see Macrory above). In the case of 
selective law enforcement, however, the boundaries between the informal and formal 
enforcement structures are blurred. Since non-compliance with either informal rules or 
formal laws can lead to punishment, the intentions behind the punishment are not always 
clear for the punished or the observers. This poses a challenge for all informal interest 
wanting to make use of the formal enforcement structure. As the formal procedures are pro 
forma, the informal rules that form the real basis for punishment must be communicated. 
Furthermore, the message has to be strong enough to override the courts’ formal arguments 
for prosecution. Without a common recognition of the real reasons for punishment, the 
enforcers will not reach their goal of deterrence.  
The need for communication can be explained through a hypothetical example: If one out of 
five human rights organizations are fined for breaking state standards on fire security, while 
only one out of ten other organizations are subject to similar sanctions, there may be three 
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reasons. First, human rights organizations may pay less attention to fire security than other 
organizations. Second, they might share characteristics legitimizing demands for higher 
security standards, such as being in possession of unique archive material or arranging 
seminars particularly crowded with people. Third, they might share one or more extra-legal 
criteria for formal punishment.76 
The punished’s own interpretation of the punishment is of the essence. If the NGOs believe 
that poor fire security is the only reason for their punishment, they will probably pay their 
fines and consider future improvements along this line. In the minds of the punished there 
will not be any incentives to change the modus operandi of the organization. In the opposite 
case, the punished believe that informal interest is behind their punishment, and that the 
inspection is just a pretext. In this case they will consider what other criteria might have 
triggered their punishment and make their further actions based on this interpretation. 
Conclusively, in order to explore how selective law enforcement has unfolded in a case-
specific context, the researcher needs to engage with only questions regarding the formal 
structure, but also with the perceptions of the punished. Knowledge about the latter can in a 
way describe the phenomenon’s unfolding more precisely than would a study of intentions. 
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4. NGOs and the Formal Enforcement Structure in 
Russia 
In the period between 2006 and the summer of 2008, the formal enforcement structure 
responsible for regulating Russian NGOs had particular characteristics unique for that 
period. This was not least due to the new amendments to the NGO legislation and the 
extended powers they granted the FRS with regard to monitoring and enforcing regulatory 
demands. In 2008 the enforcement structure was changed again, when the NGO department 
of the FRS was dismantled. Its responsibilities and much of the personnel were transferred to 
the Russian Ministry of Justice. 
In this chapter I first examine the formal enforcement structure involved with regulating 
NGOs in Russia. I discuss the new NGO-law and the traits that made it an attractive piece of 
legislation in matters of selective law enforcement. I also examine existing reports on its 
selective implementation. Second, I turn to the informants, presenting the legal basis behind 
the prosecution of their NGOs, before looking at the imposed punishment. In the third part of 
the chapter, I present a typology of typical traits of incoherence and discuss various forms of 
punishment related to selective law enforcement. 
4.1 Formal Regulation of NGOs Activities 2006-2008 
4.1.1 The NGO-Law of 2006 
Observers report that legislation directly relevant for NGOs is wielded selectively. This 
includes NGO legislation, tax legislation, regulations on fire security and sanitary conditions, 
building and labour code, anti-extremist legislation and software piracy legislation. The legal 
charges raised against my informants’ NGOs were based on the former three of the above 
bodies of legislation, in addition to one case of harassment based on visa-regulations and one 
court case concerning the contracts regulating the use of an NGO’s premises. The most 
important legal foundation for selective law enforcement against Russian NGOs in this 
period was provided by the amendments to NGO legislation signed and implemented in 
2006. The following review of the NGO-law does not only serve the function of 
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contextualizing the informants’ experiences – it also provides a useful case-study in 
investigating what may characterize legislation applied in selective law enforcement in 
general. 
Russian NGO legislation most importantly consists of the “Law on Non-Commercial 
Organizations”, the “Law on Public Associations”, and subsequent amendments to these two. 
Especially the amendments of 2006 – formally a bill “On Introducing Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” signed by president Putin in January 
2006 and implemented in April the same year – have become an important tool in selective 
law enforcement.77 In the reviewed discourse, this document has been named “the NGO-
law” for short, a popular term I also adapt in this thesis.  
In the investigated period, the law was a frequent topic of debate within the NGO 
community. Critical analyses of the NGO-law, for instance the influential interpretation of 
the International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), hold that it contradicts existing 
regulation, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation.78 Furthermore, they characterize the law as poorly 
formulated and unclear from a judicial point of view. The critics also point to what they 
deem extremely burdensome administrative demands.79 The latter two traits will be 
elaborated below. 
Some critics, including my informant and co author of Nepravetel’stvennye, held the new 
law to be a Kremlin doomsday device for the NGO-community disloyal to the authorities.80 
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The need to regulate the Russian civil society was real, but some feared the adopted medicine 
threatened to kill the patient. Later it became clear that the law did not eliminate civil society 
with a stroke of the pen. Studies of its implementation soon determined, however, that the 
law was manipulated for extra-legal purposes on several occasions.81 
Existing analyses of the NGO-law can shed some light on what characterizes a law some 
view as tailored especially for selective law enforcement. According to my discussion of 
Ledeneva’s theory above, the law should constitute (a part of) a legal framework according 
to which everyone can be found guilty in some way or another. Existing reports have already 
argued that the NGO-law did provide a fundamental basis for selective law enforcement in 
the period of interest.82 I here aim to reveal which traits of this legislation make it so 
attractive for purposes of selective law enforcement. 
A Triangular Legal Trap 
I base this brief review of the 2006 amendments in NGO legislation on a range of reports 
published by both Russian and international NGOs as well as independent scholars.83 I focus 
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on three traits which I deem highly relevant in relation to the question of what characterizes 
the legal basis for selective law enforcement. These characteristics also play a large part in 
the examined secondary literature. They are: (1) the NGO-law’s administrative demands; (2) 
its potential for harsh sanctions; and (3) its vague formulations and the discretion it gives to 
officials interpreting them. Put together, these traits can theoretically constitute a triangular 
legal trap by which any NGO can be found guilty of some infringements.84 
With regard to the administrative demands, the most problematic provisions concern 
paperwork upon registration, annual reporting and coping with various inspections.85 The 
formal requirements to documentation for the NGOs are so demanding – both due to their 
complexity and the sheer amount of paperwork – that the NGOs need professional expertise 
in cases where the law is interpreted strictly.86 Not only does this lead to frustration within 
the NGOs, but it also involves significant costs. The average expenditures on bureaucracy for 
NGOs in 2007 were estimated around 40% higher than that of a comparable commercial 
enterprise.87  
Not only are the requirements difficult to cope with for organizations, but they are also 
impossible to enforce for the authorities. The amendments require NGOs to deliver annual 
reports on their work and financial expenditures. In 2007 only 20% of these reports were 
delivered on time. In 2008 the number increased to 25%.88 In other words, the law is met 
with massive non-compliance. As a consequence, the FRS must either make some form of 
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selection or refrain from enforcing the bureaucratic demands at all. Even an FRS official 
admits it was impossible to read all the delivered material anyway. 89  
Granted the harsh demand for details associated with administrative responsibilities, one also 
expects everyone to make mistakes at some point. As one NGO leader commented: “It is 
impossible to prepare a ton of papers for the FRS without making mistakes […] the mistakes 
found will provide the basis for liquidating the groups through the courts, on a completely 
legal basis”.90 The law grants the FRS the rights to reject registration on the vague grounds 
that the NGO “fails to execute its documents properly”.91 Soon after the law was 
implemented, it became clear that the FRS in some cases had refused registration on the 
grounds of minor errors and typos – and allegedly even when they did not exist.92 
The critics of the NGO-law also consider the punishment for such minor infringements to be 
too harsh. First, NGOs can be denied registration on these grounds. It is possible for NGOs 
to operate without being registered with the authorities, but their rights are then considerably 
restricted.93 In addition, for registered NGOs, one minor infringement can lead to a formal 
warning. If it is repeated, the FRS can seek to exclude the NGO from the register.94 The law 
is even harsher with regard to foreign NGOs with branches in Russia; these can supposedly 
be excluded for one single minor infringement without a formal warning in advance.95  
The interpretation of the NGO-law’s provisions for exclusion has however been challenged. 
According to Ahmetgaliev et al., the main FRS interpretation of infringement (narušenie) is 
not consistent with Russian law. Ahmetgaliev et al. argue that many of these infringements 
should be considered inadequacies (nedostatki), a different legal term associated with less 
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severe punishment. They also report that the official legal interpretation of this definitional 
issue varies.96 Within their regulatory mandate, the FRS can also hand out official sanctions 
in the form of relatively small fines, placing the NGOs in a difficult position, as they are 
legally obliged to spend all their money in accordance with their official goals and thus not 
allowed to spend them on fines.97 
In addition to the sanctions that can be imposed through exposing non-compliance with 
administrative demands, administrative procedures can be considered punishment in 
themselves. As noted, annual reporting and inspections are associated with formidable 
amounts of work for some NGOs. An economic analysis estimated that based on 2006-
budgets, the FRS would either have to inspect every NGO once every 80 years, or spend 41 
times less time on each inspection, or select some organizations for closer inspection while 
ignoring the rest.98 The FRS went for the third alternative, and the selection process is 
therefore crucial. The agency stated that the guidelines for this selection had been created by 
a special group of experts from civil society and the Public Chamber. According to the 
authors of Nepravitel’stvennye, however, this does not correspond with reality.99 The 
selective distribution of administrative burdens can therefore play an important part in a 
mechanism of selective law enforcement. Even without formal non-compliance, the law can 
be used as a tool for signalling and enforcing informal rules. This will be discussed below as 
procedural sanctions and additional pressure for compliance. 
The third trait of the NGO-law that will be addressed here is the abundance of vague 
formulations and paragraphs in which wide discretion is granted the FRS without demands 
for further explanation or justification.100 As will bee seen, one such discretionary provision 
is especially important in the prosecution of my informants’ NGOs, namely the FRS 
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prerogative to initiate court cases against an organization which it deems not promoting its 
stated goals or not working in accordance with its legal status.101 The regulations specifying 
the grounds on which the FRS can make this decision are poor or all but non-existing.102 An 
example of a problematic definitional issue which the NGO encounter on an everyday basis, 
regards the nature of ‘meetings’. According to the NGO-law of 2006 NGOs must now 
provide the FRS information about all their meetings, but the law does not provide a clear 
definition on what constitutes a meeting. As one informant asked me rhetorically: “should 
we consider this a meeting”?103 The ICNL also reports on several other problems with regard 
to lacking legal definitions.104 
In particular two paragraphs, formally protecting the vital interest of the state and its people, 
contain self-evident vagueness and can presumably be wielded for many purposes. The 
formulation that gives the FRS discretion to bring NGOs to court if it is found to be 
threatening “the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity and 
unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation”, is 
probably most well-known.105 In one of the more famous court rulings based on the new 
NGO-law, a Russian NGO was liquidated, that is dissolved through the process of likvidaciâ, 
for amongst other reasons “undermining spiritual public values” and threatening the 
“sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation due to a reduction in the 
population“. The convicted NGO worked to protect the rights of sexual minorities in the 
region.106 The FRS can also deny registration on the grounds that the NGO “offends the 
morality, national or religious feelings of citizens”.107 In addition to these specific 
paragraphs, the law criminalizes NGOs that have extremists as “founders, members or 
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participants” of their organization, referring to a much criticized definition on extremism.108 
The same is the case of “foreign nationals deemed ‘undesirable’, referring to a decision left 
to the authorities’ discretion.109  
Not all relevant demands fit the above presented characteristics. For example, an NGO is not 
allowed to have someone suspected of money laundering as a “founder, member or 
participant” of their organization.110 The paragraph thus undermines the principle 
presumption of innocence, as its opens for criminalizing organizations based on mere 
suspicions. Furthermore, since NGOs are not allowed to access the list of suspected money 
launderers, it is in effect impossible for an NGO to make sure to comply with the demand.111 
Reports on Selective Implementation 
Given its vagueness, most observers agreed that the NGO-law relied much upon 
interpretation. Consequently, the following years were marked by attempts to monitor and 
document its implementation. Observers attempted to measure selective law enforcement 
through both quantitative and qualitative research. Especially in earlier reports on the law’s 
implementation, observers made some attempts to measure the overall impact on civil 
society, although scant available material made this difficult.112 Although several of the 
presented cases were striking examples that the law sometimes was used politically, it 
proved difficult to determine the extent to which the FRS was guided by ulterior motives. 
The lack of firm quantitative data reflected the dubious governmental sources and the 
murkiness surrounding these issues in general. NGOs often cited quantitative ‘facts’, 
sometimes referring to official sources, but also these relied upon fluctuating data. Even such 
basic knowledge as the total number of NGOs varies by hundreds of thousands(!).113 
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The basis for quantitative estimates improved after the FRS in 2008 published their own 
material for 2007 on various forms of activities, including inspections, denials of 
registration, cases sent to court, and more.114 Yet, due to the issue’s complexity, these 
numbers in themselves provided no real insight into the law’s impact. Firstly, a vast number 
of formal court proceedings were held against non-existing organizations in order to remove 
them from the official register. Ahmetgaliev et al. refer to a Moscow judge who in [about] a 
thousand cases of such procedures could remember only four where representatives from the 
NGOs actually met in court.115 Without doubt, many Russian NGOs had ceased to exist, only 
present on paper before their official removal. Since nobody knew their numbers, however, 
the amount of actively operating NGOs also remained unknown. 
The subjective nature of selective law enforcement also complicates attempts at its 
measurement. It is by not feasible to objectively determine how many cases of formal 
punishment are legitimate and how many are linked to law enforcers’ abuse of power. As 
reflected in the low number of cases sufficiently scrutinized by human rights organizations, 
the individual prosecutions are marked by extensive complexity and subjectivity. Again, a 
manipulative use of legislation was documented, but the extent of this practice remained 
unknown. To my knowledge, no large-N statistical correlation between law enforcement and 
extra-legal criteria has been proven. In addition, the reports often fail to underscore the 
subjective nature of the phenomenon under investigation, and this arguably undermines the 
academic value they aspire to. 
Regarding reporting on micro-level, the NGOs’ work proves more successful. The cases 
brought forward clearly displayed how some NGOs suffered severely from the 
implementation of the new legislation. The cases, however, were often recycled. Especially 
the illegitimate legal prosecution of the same dozen human rights organizations were 
repeated time and again.116 In sum, although Ahmetgaliev et al. provided an important 
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stepping stone in 2008, systematic research into illegitimate punishment against Russian 
NGOs has so far not been completed.  
A Turn in the Debate 
The reports on implementation of the new law took on another nuance when it gradually 
became clear that leading human rights organizations in fact often won in court, and that the 
number of closed active NGOs was not as high as many feared it would be. As a 
consequence, the more recent reports differ slightly from the earlier in terms of focus, 
gradually shifting from direct legal sanctions towards the harsh climate for NGOs in general. 
Still, the stories are often told through the experiences of human rights organizations. While 
the reports emphasize the heavy impact on less resourceful NGOs, the case-studies and 
quoted statements typically derive from the human rights community. 
The April 2008 report from CDDHR is typical for the new wave of interpretation. The report 
acknowledges that “the NGO-law has not resulted in the wholesale closure of a large number 
of NGOs”. The report worries, however, that observers “sorely underestimate” the indirect 
consequences of the legal situation.117 The report of the Moscow Helsinki Group (MGH) and 
Human Rights without Frontiers (HRWF) concludes in a similar way:  
While not all problematic provisions have been applied so far, the law has 
proven to be open to arbitrary and selective implementation, and it has been 
used to impede, restrict and punish legitimate NGOs activities. It has 
seriously constrained the day-to-day work of NGOs throughout the country 
and contributed to growing insecurity and vulnerability of NGOs.118 
These insights are essential for understanding today’s situation. The broad and sometimes 
hidden impact of law enforcement is further elaborated below. 
4.1.2 A Note on the Role of Courts 
In hybrid or authoritarian regimes, the political leadership possess an extensive arsenal to 
ensure the loyalty of the bureaucracy, including the enforcement agencies responsible for 
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regulating NGOs’ activities.119 The enforcement agencies possess, by virtue of their 
regulatory prerogatives, extensive powers of sanctioning even when operating outside the 
court system.120 Thus, the political executives possess a rather direct channel to punish 
NGOs. Nonetheless, the agencies must involve the courts when the most severe sanctions are 
imposed, including processes of likvidaciâ and exclusion for the state register. Furthermore, 
the NGO-law respects the NGOs’ rights to appeal most FRS decisions to court, including 
formal warning letters and other administrative sanctions. Therefore, courts do play an 
important role in the enforcement structure relevant to this thesis. As will be seen, their 
performance proved highly relevant for the outcome of selective law enforcement in the 
investigated cases. 
The political and economical independence of the current Russian courts is disputed. Peter 
H. Solomon is among the many who acknowledge Putin’s effort to improve the performance 
of the legal system. The judicial branch has undergone several large-scale reforms to increase 
its independence, or at least to reduce low level corruption and inefficiency. The Russian 
government has poured considerable resources into the legal system and the salaries for 
judges have increased substantially.121 On the other hand, one might question if the reforms 
are intended to make courts and judges politically independent on all issues. In addition, old 
habits are known to die slowly.122 
Acquittal rates are generally low in Russia, especially in cases involving the state. Solomon 
links this partly to Soviet legacy – the old structure of the law enforcement system and the 
professional identities it supported. In the old formal enforcement structure, suspicions of 
violations should in theory not be taken to court before the evidence proved firm. In other 
words, ‘accusational bias’ was a way to lend judicial power to the executive branch of 
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power.123 According to Olga Schwarts, many Russian judges still identify with the law 
enforcement structure and its responsibility to fight crime and oppose the defence counsel.124 
Sergei Tsirkun, a Moscow prosecutor, never lost a case in ten years: “A judge is not going to 
pass an acquittal unless he is absolutely 100 percent confident that someone is innocent. If he 
has the slightest suspicion that someone might be guilty, he will find them guilty even if he 
has to ignore problems with the evidence”.125  
Martin Shapiro explains the balance between independence and political bias by means of 
game theory. For courts striving to become legitimate within authoritarian regimes, Shapiro 
argues, it is necessary to obtain a balance between genuine independence and alignment with 
political tendencies. On the one hand, it is vital for the courts to act relatively independently 
to secure legitimacy with the population and relevant actors. On the other hand, the courts 
can not challenge the authorities to the extent that the regime “openly ignores or controls 
them”, as they then would lose said legitimacy. If they manage to uphold that balance, they 
will maintain some legitimacy which will also legitimize the regime itself.126 As the regime 
benefits from the legitimacy the courts lend them, it will be reluctant to interfere with the 
work unless the situation is considered particularly important.  
If we accept Shapiro’s abstraction, his theoretical remarks do fit the factual situation of 
courts in contemporary Russia. As Solomon concludes: At the fall of 2006, Russian courts 
were “sufficiently independent to act impartially in most cases.” At the same time, he also 
emphasizes that “especially through the operation of informal institutions, judges do 
sometimes experience pressure and come to conform to the wishes of powerful persons.”127 
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4.2 Formal Prosecution of the Informants’ NGOs 
4.2.1 The Legal Foundation  
In the prosecution of my informants NGOs, there are evident similarities in the legal 
foundation for prosecution. With due respect for the complexity of legal cases, most of the 
charges can be framed within two specific bodies of legislation, namely NGO and tax 
legislation. In about half of the legal cases against my informants, the prosecution was based 
on a combination of the two. As mentioned, Džibladze holds that this combination was 
indeed the most typical tool in selective prosecution of NGOs between the new law’s 
implementation in 2006 and the reforms within the state apparatus in 2008.128 
Procecution Based on NGO legislation129 
Not surprisingly, the charges against the informants’ NGOs often referred to violations of 
NGO legislation. 
When NGOs register with the authorities, they must register within subcategories regarding 
both the general character and the geographical impact of their work. Citizens’ Watch (CW) 
and the Centre for Enlightenment and Research Programs (CERP) were both accused of 
operating beyond their mandate as regional organizations. Maksim Timofeev and Mariâ 
Kanevskaâ are lawyers and represent respectively CW and CERP.130 Both state that the FRS 
in these cases interpreted the law erroneously. According to the FRS’ interpretation, CW 
should have been registered as an international organization for attending workshops abroad, 
claims Timofeev.131  
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In the case of Citizens’ Watch, the inspection first resulted in a formal warning, which the 
NGO later appealed to court.132 In the case of CERP, the charges added up to accusations 
that the NGO’s activities did not fit its formally stated purpose. More specifically, the FRS 
questioned if CERP’s workshop activities with police officers regarding immigrants’ rights 
could be defined as enlightenment, as was CERP’s officially stated purpose, and not 
education, which is a separate legal definition.133 Also Memorial’s Moscow office had some 
problems regarding the nature of their work, facing complaints that their practice of 
providing free legal assistance was not in accordance with the legal definition of charity. In 
Russian NGO legislation, charitable organizations constitute a separate legal category with 
specific rights and duties.134 
The FRS also charged CERP for violating one of the vaguest formulations in the NGO-law. 
The above mentioned project suggested a view that the police was not sufficiently aware of 
migrants’ rights. This statement was by the FRS interpreted as undermining the credibility of 
the Russian police and hence the Russian state’s interests.135  
I expect the informants to downplay allegations of minor administrative infringements in 
their specific cases, not least because the legitimacy of the charges may be harder to contest. 
The Environmental Rights Centre Bellona (ERC Bellona), however, has published the exact 
complaints the FRS had against their organization on its website. These include two 
accusations of administrative infringements. The first accusation stated irregularities 
regarding a document signed by a member of the board – allegedly not authorized. In the 
second, the FRS claimed ERC Bellona had failed to report the “purpose of expenditure of the 
monetary assets” on one occasion. 136 According to the law, all of the NGOs expenditures 
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must be explicitly linked to a purpose. It should be noted that these two charges resulted 
from a total of 381 pages of material delivered for inspection.137 
In sum, many charges based on Russian NGO legislation seem, at least as the informants 
interpret them, to be based on loosely defined ‘rubber’ paragraphs; paragraphs that could be 
stretched to encompass anyone at the discretion of the FRS. Charges based on accusations of 
working outside the boundaries of registered legal categories or officially stated purposes 
were recurring. In the case of CERP, also the state’s vital interests were formally considered 
threatened. Kanevskaâ is frustrated regarding the catch-all nature of the law: “Based on this 
paragraph, everyone can be closed down”.138 The only investigated charges based on purely 
administrative infringements of NGO legislation were filed in the formal warning imposed 
on ERC Bellona. Not only were the charges based on scrutinizing a large amount of 
documentation, but the official warning was also rejected in court. 
Prosecution Based on Taxation Issues 
As the FRS got extended powers of monitoring through the NGO-law of 2006, the tax 
agencies’ activities did not decrease proportionately. On the contrary – the increased 
monitoring power of the FRS often resulted in the tax authorities subsequently being notified 
of possible infringements.139 An AGORA-report claims to have documented that the FRS 
has actively coordinated their efforts with other governmental agencies to crack down on 
selected NGOs simultaneously.140 
CW and ERC Bellona both received financial support from the Consulate General of Great 
Britain in St. Petersburg and the Dutch government’s MATRA program. Within the 
agreements between the donors and the NGOs, there were clauses about mentioning their 
donors’ names whenever, in the case of the Consulate, the supported project was mentioned 
in “the mass media, as well as in materials created in the course of the implementation of the 
programme” or, in the case of MATRA, “when holding any activities in the framework of 
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the project”.141 The FRS therefore claimed that both NGOs had been evading advertising tax 
and filed its accusations in certificates of audit (a document reporting on the outcome of 
inspections). CW and ERC Bellona thus faced almost identical charges of “gross violation of 
the rules of revenue and tax base accounting”, with reference to the Internal Revenue 
Code.142 
In the case of Memorial, their Moscow staff fought against charges from both the FRS and 
the tax authorities. Memorial hands out free information on a regular basis, including printed 
books. According to the tax agencies, the NGO should pay taxes on these books as long as 
they can not prove that they were gifts. The tax officials demanded that such a proof had to 
include the full names, signatures and personal information about the receivers. In addition 
the receivers should be prepared to witness in court about receiving the books for free. For a 
non-profit organization it would be extremely difficult to cope with these extra burdens.143 
Summarized, it seems that taxation issues played a significant role in filing cases and issuing 
fines against non-governmental organizations in Russia in the period I have investigated. 
Charges based on tax legislation often occurred in combination with other legal procedures, 
typically founded on NGO legislation. Another recurring trait is that non-profit NGOs are 
accused of avoiding taxes they should have paid had they been commercial. According to 
Natal’â Taubina, leader of the NGO Public Verdict, it is typical for Russian tax authorities to 
lack competence on legislation regarding non-profit activities.144 The courts’ final rulings 
support this statement – in all the cases based on taxation legislation, the charges were 
rejected in court. 
Legal Basis for Prosecution Originating in Other Legislation 
The informants’ NGOs also faced varying legal problems based on other legislation than 
NGO and tax regulations. 
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In the case of the European University of St. Petersburg (EUSPB), fire security regulation 
served as pretext for the NGO’s legal problems. In order to attain and keep its educational 
licenses, the private university formally has to respect extra strict demands for fire security. 
The university has therefore been regularly controlled by the State Fire Inspection (GPI) for 
years. In early 2008 the university was suddenly forced to cease its operation. Neither the 
building’s standards nor the law had changed, although the financial situation of the state 
agency had improved. Barandova deems the sudden enforcement of the fire security demands 
to be politically motivated, coming up some weeks before the presidential elections in 
March.145 The GPI arranged for a temporarily close-down of the university and among other 
demands instructed the university to widen its corridors. This would, however, not have been 
allowed within the legislation regulating old heritage buildings in the historical centre of St. 
Petersburg. If not given exceptions in one way or another, the university would either have 
had to move to another building, or close permanently.146 Some time after the presidential 
elections, however, the authorities and the university came to an agreement, and the 
university could continue its activities. 147 
Stefaniâ Kulaeva, long-time active in the Memorial movement and at the time of the 
interview heading its anti-discrimination centre in St. Petersburg (ADC Memorial), states in 
the interview to have experienced problems with the Migration Service. A visiting officer 
claimed that Memorial’s German volunteers had incorrect documents for their stay in Russia. 
These accusations implicitly link to the NGO-law, which forbids NGOs to have foreign 
nationals in conflict with Russian legislation as “participants” in their work.148 This episode 
never resulted in any written documents, but it exemplifies how state officials exploit their 
formal mandate as law enforcers by wielding it selectively: 
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The officer asked me about our voluntaries from Germany, and I named them 
by memory. He kept a list that he hid from my sight with his hand. Referring 
to this list, he stated that I had left two names out. It turned out that the names 
were written two times on his list, and that I’d already mentioned them. Then 
he claimed we had issued wrong visa for our volunteers – they should have 
been ‘humanitarian aid’-visas. I told him that I had never heard of such an 
instruction. He responded: “ok, you’re right, but I’m the one in charge 
here”.149 
The Memorial office in St. Petersburg had also faced fire inspections, but Kulaeva did not 
find them selectively imposed. Instead she expressed support for the increased state control 
on fire security in general. 150 
The case of the Regional Press Institute (RPI) is unique among my informants with regard to 
its legal foundation. The St. Petersburg housing committee filed a claim against the PRI, 
stating that the NGO had not paid rents for parts of their premises. The committee also 
claimed the contracts regulating the use of premises were not properly registered and thus 
invalid. The contract they referred to, however, had been updated by the parties earlier and a 
copy sent to the housing committee, according to Anna Šarogradskaâ, the director of the 
institute. Šarogradskaâ also stressed that the rooms had long been occupied by another 
organization which had paid the rent all along, something they could prove. The NGO’s 
director has repeatedly stated the charges to be politically motivated.151 
4.2.2 Formal Sanctions in the Cases against the Informants 
The cases I have investigated also provide some interesting material regarding the 
effectiveness of selective law enforcement. Perhaps most striking is the degree of 
informants’ success in courts. As will be elaborated below, the NGOs perceive themselves to 
be targets of political persecution and their work has been denigrated in government rhetoric 
and in mass media friendly to the government. Still, a fair amount of the NGOs won the 
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cases in courts – in a country where acquittal rates in general are very low and where courts 
traditionally have been supporting the executive branch of power. 
The most severe punishment among the informants was arguably imposed on CERP, RPI 
and EUSPB. One staff worker in another Russian NGO, however, claimed that CERP would 
also have walked free, had its leadership made a greater effort fighting the selective law 
enforcement.152 The final outcome of the legal prosecution of CERP in 2008 remained 
unclear. Seemingly the NGO was from November 2008 rehabilitated and again legally 
registered.153  
The court rejected RPI’s initial appeal. Regardless if the rent was paid by other 
organizations, the court found the contracts not in accordance with formal demands. 
According to a journalist from Novaâ Gazeta, all that mattered to the court’s decision was 
formalistic bureaucracy, while other well documented facts of obvious relevance were 
ignored.154 The RPI was sentenced to pay the 750,000 roubles of rent, and was thrown out of 
their premises at the St. Petersburg House of Journalists.155 
In the case of EUSPB, the NGO was closed down temporarily, in principle until the fire 
security had been improved to a satisfactory level. As noted above, the demanded level was 
unattainable within the legislation regulating the use of heritage buildings. The final damage 
to the EUSPB, however, turned out to be less severe than first expected. Even the program of 
Grigorij Golosov, which many believed was the real centre of the conflict, was continued – 
contrary to Golosov’s own expectations.156 Still, the university’s activities were suspended in 
the period of the presidential elections, which according to one interpretation is exactly what 
was intended from the very outset of the prosecution.157 
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In the similar charges against CW and ERC Bellona, the FRS called for the tax authorities to 
make further investigations, a call that was rejected. The FRS also filed formal warnings in a 
certificate of audit. As noted above, a formal warning in itself is not a harsh sanction, but it 
worsens the future legal security of the NGO. Both CW and ERC Bellona appealed the 
formal warning to court. The same did Memorial Moscow, which in addition was initially 
issued a fine by the tax authorities. After an initial treatment in the court system, the fine was 
reduced dramatically, but the organization nonetheless appealed again. Elena Žemkova, 
executive director of the Moscow office, states that the decision to appeal a second time was 
first and foremost a matter of principle. Facing a fine, however, would also have placed the 
NGO in a curious legal situation, mentioned above.158 In the end, Memorial Moscow was 
fully rehabilitated. Along the way, however, it spent a large amount of resources in dealing 
with “more of less constant inspections” and not least by fighting in court for one and a half 
year.159  
CW and ERC Bellona were both acquitted in court, but also complain about the burdensome 
processes. Timofeev in CW suggests that state agencies use administrative measures 
deliberately to keep pressure on the NGOs while simultaneously hindering them in 
functioning effectively.160 
4.3 The Legal Foundation - A Typology of Incoherence 
The legal charges against the informants’ NGOs have certain similarities. The cases that are 
based on NGO legislation match to a large degree the expectations to weak or incoherent 
legislation. The FRS utilized several provisions in the NGO-law that had been criticized 
earlier for being too vague or too burdensome to comply with. The various accusations of tax 
evasion are often based on the tax legislation while not considering the exceptions valid for 
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charitable and non-profit work. In these cases, incompetence seems just as important as weak 
legislation. 
As seen above, the selective enforcement of the NGO-law is built on several paragraphs and 
definitions whose interpretation is disputed. Certainly a law must always be somewhat 
flexible so that fairness in each unique case is not sacrificed for formalistic rigidity. When 
questions regarding legality to a large degree are up for debate, however, it undermines the 
authority of the law and increases the influence of those who are in charge of its 
implementation. Given the strict interpretation of the FRS, we can see patterns similar to 
Ledeneva’s model. Ledeneva states that “the incoherence of formal rules compels almost all 
Russians, willingly or unwillingly, to violate them”.161 This is a popular way to frame the 
question among informants and analytics alike: “according to this, everyone can be found 
guilty”.  
The below typology categorizes some traits of legislation that strengthen the potential for 
selective law enforcement to be successful. The typology is not necessarily exhaustive but 
reflects the findings of this research. The categories are also not rigid, and can be 
overlapping. Still, they help to explain some fundamental problems of Russian NGO 
legislation and why it plays such a significant role in selective law enforcement. I identify 
four distinguishable categories of relevance; catch-all paragraphs, administrative catch-all 
traps, rubber paragraphs, and generic security concerns. 
Catch-All Paragraphs 
Maybe the most obvious component to look for in legislation, according to which everyone 
might be found guilty, is the catch-all paragraph. Catch-all legislation and incoherent 
legislation can often be considered synonymous. In this thesis, however, a catch-all 
paragraph refers to a piece of official law or regulation, according to which a large amount of 
the legal subjects indeed is guilty of non-compliance. When a large number of subjects does 
not comply, “punishment becomes a resource in short supply”.162 Faced with a catch-all 
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paragraph, the law enforcers are therefore left with only two choices: enforce the paragraph 
according to some selection or do not enforce it at all. 
In accordance with the above definition, the legal demand does not need to be impossible to 
follow in order to be characterized as catch-all. It is sufficient that it is not in line with its 
subject’s expectations or norms. Software piracy is illegal in many countries; still a large 
amount of teenagers download such material weekly if given access to the necessary 
hardware. This is not because they are unable to refrain from doing so, but because they do 
not acknowledge neither the associated norm nor the real potential for punishment. This is 
also central with Ledeneva, who states that informal practices thrive where there are 
discrepancies between societal norms and formal rules.163 A sudden punishment of one 
single non-complier would certainly cause uproar in most democratic states – neither the law 
nor its arbitrary or selective enforcement is consistent with the societal norms. 
An apt example from the investigated cases is the EUSPB’s problems with the fire security 
agency, GPI. Barandova, who was actively defending the university, holds that the list of 
requirements and procedures indeed was formally correct. Yet, strict compliance was not 
expected to be necessary, given that fire security is poor in most old St. Petersburg buildings 
and that the regulations had never before been enforced strictly against the EUSPB.164  
Administrative Catch-All Traps 
Administrative measures can also be functioning as a kind of catch-all mechanism, if they 
lead to massive non-compliance and are connected to significant punishment. When this is 
the case, their enforcement is likely to be regarded as selective. In an administrative catch-all 
trap, each isolated demand could be fulfilled. The sheer amount of demands, however, makes 
it difficult or close to impossible to comply with every detail. The response among Russian 
NGOs has often been reluctance to cope with even parts of it. In this way, strictness 
unaligned with common norms can turn out to be counterproductive in terms of formal 
regulation, encouraging mass non-compliance and making effective enforcement difficult. 
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The 2006 amendments to the legislation on non-governmental organizations include 
administrative demands that have been described as so strict that nobody could really fulfil 
them. Regardless of what is possible or not, the empirical evidence is clear regarding mass 
non-compliance on these matters. In 2007 only 20% of the NGOs delivered annual reports in 
time. In 2008, the percentage went up slightly to 25%.165 In other words, non-compliance has 
been, and presumably still is, the standard. 
With regard to cases against the informants’ NGOs, parts of the procedures against ERC 
Bellona could provide an example of a catch-all trap in effect. Among a total of several 
hundred pages of documentation presented during the period of the FRS’ inspection, 
accusations on two minor infringements were allegedly found and filed in a certificate of 
audit. In this case, however, the court rejected the FRS’ accusations. Thus, the state agency 
did not manage to apply the administrative catch-all trap in this case after all.  
Rubber Paragraphs 
Similar to catch-all paragraphs are the rubber paragraphs, recognized by the great discretion 
they grant the law enforcement structure in terms of interpretation. Such discretion is 
typically resulting from the lack of definitional clarification. These paragraphs can be 
stretched like rubber, hence the name, to encompass most legal subjects. In other words, 
rubber paragraphs provide another kind of catch-all mechanism, but only according to their 
strictest interpretation. 
The FRS was, until the summer of 2008, legally authorized to decide whether or not an 
NGO’s activity had been promoting the goals set by the organization itself. The discretion 
left to enforcement agencies was in this regard so wide that this and other provisions by 
many observers were expected to be wielded against the NGOs unwanted by the authorities. 
This is a typical example of a rubber provision – a provision that could be stretched to fit the 
purpose of the enforcers or the informal interests manipulating them. 
Rubber paragraphs provided the legal basis for prosecution in several cases. ERC Bellona, 
CW, CERP and Memorial Moscow all faced accusations that they did not work according to 
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their registered legal category. Importantly, rubber paragraphs always make room for legal 
discussion in courts. In the case of ERC Bellona, CW and Memorial alike, the FRS did not 
manage to convince the courts to accept its interpretation.  
Generic Security Concerns 
Security concerns can be considered a sub-category of the rubber paragraphs as described 
above. However, they are clearly distinguished by their explicit reference to political goals of 
vital importance – to safeguard the territorial integrity, legal order or essential values of 
society. Threats against these fundamental pillars of the state cannot be defined precisely, 
and thus the legal formulations dealing with them are by necessity vague. They are 
deliberately designed to initiate informal negotiations of legality in crisis management.166 As 
other rubber paragraphs, they refuse to make sense within a strictly formal view upon law. 
An apt example of a generic security concern is legislation formally combating extremism or 
terrorism. Authorities will not let a terrorist walk away and the law should not be an 
obstacle: ‘show me a terrorist, and I will find a paragraph to match’. 
Activists and political opposition have been criticizing the authorities for including such 
paragraphs in the NGO-law. They argue that these formulations can be used – and in fact 
have been used – as political tools of repression, in conflict with both constitutional and 
international human rights. The most frequently quoted of the security concerns included in 
the NGO-law is the one applied against CERP. As noted, the FRS charged CERP for 
threatening the state’s interests. CERP suggested the Russian police had insufficient 
knowledge of migrants rights, something that was interpreted as undermining the police’s 
integrity, and hence the integrity of the Russian Federation.167 
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4.4 Punishment – More Than Legal Sanctions 
As argued above, the mechanism of selective law enforcement is feeding like a parasite on a 
weak formal system. The weak formal system grants informal interests with the possibility to 
apply the law selectively according to extra-legal criteria. In choosing this strategy, however, 
the informal interests become dependent on the enforcement structure’s ability to impose 
punishment. As seen, the courts have rejected the formal charges against the NGOs in 
several cases. Therefore, the enforcement at first glance seems to have failed. The courts, 
however, are not included in the legal process before the final stage. Both existing reports 
and the interviews indicate that regardless of acquittals in courts, the processes carry with 
them several unpleasant consequences. In addition, the legal processes themselves hurt the 
NGO as they unfold, exhausting their time and resources. 
The variety of ways to punish selected NGOs is extensive and this remains true even when 
we focus entirely on the mechanism of selective enforcement. The presented empirical data 
proves that punishment includes, but is not limited to, legal sanctions. A way to 
operationalize punishment is to look at whether or not the non-compliers are put in a worse 
situation than those who complies.168 According to many informants, this is the case 
irrespective of acquittals in courtrooms. To bring the discussion of selective law enforcement 
further, we thus need to take a closer look on what might constitute punishment, 
transcending the scope of legal sanctions.  
4.4.1 A Typology of Punishment 
Punishment takes many forms. Some are linked directly to the mechanism of selective law 
enforcement, and some are not. None of the varying forms should be neglected, although the 
former are here of primary interest. The categories identified below are, in the order of 
presentation, formal legal sanctions, procedural punishment, additional pressure for formal 
compliance, and indirect punishment. Notably, the last three are not dependents on the 
judicial branch’s powers of sanctioning.  
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Formal Legal Sanctions 
A formal legal sanction is punishment formally sought by the law enforcement agencies. The 
legal sanction always refers explicitly to alleged non-compliance with the formal rules. Some 
of the informants have experienced formal legal sanctions, including CERP and RPI, though 
in the case of RPI, the punishment was formally the enforcement of a private contract. 
Administrative legal sanctions were initially imposed by state agencies upon Memorial 
Moscow, CW and ERC. These were however appealed to court, where the NGOs won. 
Procedural Punishment 
Procedural punishment is a form of punishment legally embedded in formal procedure codes, 
but still not officially recognized as a legal sanction. The FRS can hinder an NGO’s work to 
a considerable degree by procedures such as making inspections, rejecting registrations and 
initiate court-cases. As these procedures clearly hinder the NGOs from their full functioning 
and originate with official legal documents, they are directly relevant with regard to selective 
law enforcement. 
Seemingly, much discretion is left with the enforcement agencies both with regard to the 
selection of which NGOs are to be inspected and to the amount of work that each inspection 
impose on the selected NGO. As noted, both external observers and representatives of the 
FRS deemed the requirements impossible to enforce. In other words, also the state capacity 
to make inspections and survey delivered material is a “resource in short supply”.169 
Regarding inspections, the authorities have chosen to investigate only some organizations, 
but the official justification for this selection does allegedly not hold water.170 
As have been seen, the incoherent law makes room for a lot of court proceedings even when 
the NGOs in the end can prove themselves not guilty, and the NGOs need to spend a lot of 
time and resources to win the cases. The same is true for denials of registration, which can be 
imposed selectively in the same way as other punishment. Attempts to register may succeed 
in the end, but considerable time and resources are wasted in the process.171 Importantly, 
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procedural punishment is not formally recognized as punishment. This makes it even more 
attractive as a weapon. First, it can be imposed without the support from courts. Second, 
because of the inspections’ status as regular monitoring, the NGO have a hard time arguing 
against their legitimacy. 
Additional Pressure for Formal Compliance 
Additional pressure for compliance is closely connected to the mechanism of selective 
enforcement. Yet, it is clearly at odds with the common understanding of punishment. It 
refers to the pressure to perform excellently where others perform mediocre or fail to 
perform at all. One might say it is a burden that certain NGOs impose on themselves to 
eliminate the pretext for selective enforcement. As discussed in chapter 6, the NGOs’ efforts 
to comply with formal demands in part contradict expectations based on Ledeneva’s model. 
The bureaucratic demands are seemingly not entirely impossible to comply with, and the 
NGOs actively pursue formal compliance even when they hold the demands unreasonable. 
With the new amendments, NGOs are required to deliver annual reports on their work and 
financial expenditures. As noted above, non-compliance with this demand is the rule rather 
than the exception. Formally, however, everyone is expected to comply with formal rules in 
the same way. The pressure to comply can therefore be framed as punishment only in a 
relative meaning. The omnipotent threat of enforcement make some NGOs live up by 
demands ignored by others. As a result, the de facto legal situation of a conscious violator of 
informal rules is worse than the one of a corresponding complier, even before any formal 
non-compliance or punishment has taken place. NGOs that perceive themselves as potential 
victims of selective law enforcement spend more time on bureaucracy than others. They 
expect their administrative reports to be more closely scrutinized than others and thus feel 
additional pressure for formal compliance. 
One interview from the field provides a striking example on how this may play out in reality. 
The informant’s NGO is according to its legal status supposed to deliver annual reports.172 
When I asked the president of the NGO about the demands, however, it turned out she had 
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never even heard of them. All the NGO was expected to deliver to the authorities, was the 
annual report for the state’s tax-service, she stated.173 The NGO leader did not fear becoming 
a victim to selective punishment and consequently did not worry about bureaucratic details. 
Notably, the demand for annual reporting is among the most criticized by other informants. 
Indirect Punishment 
This fourth category is possibly beyond the scope of selective law enforcement, but of vital 
importance for the organizations. This punishment is still selective, but only indirectly 
related to legal procedures. As mentioned, recent reports have gradually turned their focus to 
indirect problems of the NGO-law and its implementation. Indirect punishment is maybe the 
most fundamental problem for the group of NGOs the informants represent. Džibladze 
believes the marginalization of the NGO-community to be the intended purpose of selective 
law enforcement. Furthermore, he believes it to be successful:  
I don’t think the legal offensive is counterproductive. It has reached its goal 
of marginalizing the critical NGOs and isolating them from society. 
Thousands of NGO-workers have been thrown out of their offices recently 
and many more give in to intimidation. […] Because of the campaign and 
government rhetoric, NGOs have experienced isolation from the grassroots 
movement, the universities, the local branches of government agencies. I often 
meet with various organizations, stating “we like you and respect you as 
professionals, but cooperating with you is too dangerous” […]  
As a result, the impact of the NGOs’ policies has been reduced. Also some 
foreign governmental donors have withdrawn their support, as they feel they 
cannot “make your government unhappy” […] Of course, also the staff and 
leadership of NGOs are losing their motivation when they don’t see any 
influence, but are just working to cope with constant inspections. The NGOs 
have faced recruiting problems since the turning point in 2005, when 
Patruŝev called for new legislation. The young professionals, who have been 
a backbone for NGOs have earlier been drawn by good career opportunities 
and high salaries. Now it is not prestigious, and even bad to have worked for 
critical NGOs, and because of the economic development, the private and 
state sector can provide higher salaries than before.174 
By other words, the rhetoric and legal prosecution in combination have a huge impact on 
Russian human rights NGOs in terms of isolation from society. Russians and foreign 
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governments both seem reluctant to deal with organizations framed as unwanted by Russian 
authorities. Džibladze also tells of human rights NGOs that experience serious internal 
disagreements about how to cope with the ongoing politization of their work. In sum, “the 
biggest problem [regarding the legal situation of Russian NGOs] has turned out not to be the 
closure or denials of registrations or the similar, but the ‘chilling effect’ and the self-
censorship”, Džibladze concludes.175 The degree of self in self-censorship can be debated. At 
least in this context, self-censorship is just another word for successful enforcement of 
informal rules – measured in deterrence.  
4.4.2 Theoretical Remarks on Punishment 
To understand the full impact of selective law enforcement, I have adopted a broad definition 
of punishment. This choice makes for at least three theoretical remarks. First, I have stressed 
that the perceptions of why punishment takes place is a vital determinant of how the 
punished will adapt. In the same way, it is the perception of punishment that determines its 
deterring effect, regardless of the intentions behind it. Punishment defined by objective 
criteria is therefore an inaccurate tool to estimate the deterring effect: The NGOs perceive to 
be punished and will, according to a rational choice, base their further considerations on this 
perception. 
Furthermore, even if deterrence remains a vital goal of enforcement, the research indicates it 
is just one side of selective law enforcement. Compliance to informal rules can not only be 
enforced through deterrence, but also by temporarily hindering non-compliance through 
preoccupying the NGOs with administrative burdens. The costs involved also reduce the 
NGOs’ financial capacities. Even if the sanctions against EUSPB and RPI would turn out not 
to have a deterring effect, they will still contribute to hinder informal non-compliance. I 
presume that the stripping of RPI’s resources will reduce its effectiveness temporarily, and 
the university was closed for the period of the presidential elections, effectively hindering its 
possible influence on them. Also denials of registration, although not specifically 
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investigated, can provide an obstacle to effective work for NGOs, as they cannot  access their 
bank accounts etc. without registration.176 
Finally, it is also worth noting that my theoretical model in chapter 3 states that the outcome 
of selective law enforcement by definition is exclusively formal (Fig2). The research, 
however, clearly demonstrates how formal procedures also have informal consequences. 
Indirect punishment can certainly not be considered formal sanctions, yet it is in part a 
consequence of selective law enforcement. What remains crucial for understanding the 
mechanism of selective law enforcement is that punishment within this mechanism, 
regardless of its characteristics, is a product of manipulative use of the formal system. 
Although the nature of punishment in itself can be debated, it is within selective law 
enforcement always imposed through formal channels. 
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5. Informality in Selective Law Enforcement. 
Although the formal proceedings are of vital importance in the mechanism of selective law 
enforcement, they are only a pretext for enforcing informal rules. By penetrating the formal 
legal system, informal interests make use of the state’s monopoly on violence to promote 
their personal or political goals. Thus, the formal proceedings presented above are just one 
side of the story, and not very telling on its own. Now it is time to look at the informal 
aspects of selective law enforcement. 
In reports and among informants alike, the Russian authorities are accused of using the 
formal enforcement structure to achieve informal ends. This chapter, therefore, first 
discusses the informal pressure that some NGOs have experienced from the Russian 
government in the investigated period. The aggressive rhetoric does seemingly have an 
important function in communicating the informal rules in selective law enforcement against 
Russian NGOs. The second part of the chapter deals with the informants perceptions of these 
issues. Why was they selected for punishment, and how come they know why?  
Even though the informants’ answers differ, the heavy impact of informal pressure is 
unquestionable. Albeit informal rules are not as precisely formulated as written ones, their 
existence is seen as self-evident by most. Importantly, the research indicates there is a 
connection between governmental rhetoric and the informants’ perceptions of informal rules. 
In the third part of the chapter, I analyse how this link can be interpreted. I argue that since 
institutionalized informal practice leads to common expectations, the informal interests do 
not have to rely on manual control to deliver punishment selectively.  
5.1 Governmental Pressure on Russian NGOs 
Looking at official Russian statements, it is not difficult to identify certain groups of NGOs 
that do not fit the Kremlin ideal. The investigated period was marked by a peak in aggressive 
rhetoric directed specifically against parts of civil society. Within the logic of suverennaâ 
demokratiâ, the sovereign democracy, the authorities argue foreign influence on Russian 
civil society is illegitimate, interfering with the Russian people’s prerogative to rule its own 
country independently. Furthermore, the political leaders envision for Russian civil society a 
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role in cooperation with and assisting the state, rather than being a watchdog and a check 
upon the executive power. Foreign funded human rights NGOs are often in conflict with 
these policies, being both influenced by foreign capital and critical to the regime’s dealings 
with human rights issues. Interestingly, the rhetoric against foreign influence often refers to 
the NGO-law, although the law does not formally address this issue. 
Sovereign Democracy 
The doctrine of sovereign democracy is not formulated in an extra-ordinary way. Vladislav 
Surkov, a Kremlin advisor and central in the doctrine’s development, holds it necessary to 
establish a sovereign democracy “where the power, institutions and actions are chosen, 
formed, and managed exclusively by the Russian [rossijskij] nation”.177  
Strictly interpreted, however, the doctrine is in conflict with foreign aid, which is “by design 
a mechanism of international diffusion”.178 Beyond doubt, the NGOs in question do work in 
accordance with their donors’ wishes; else they would have not received the grants. 
According to Sarah Henderson’s research, Russian NGOs funded from abroad typically lack 
“grassroots’ consistency, and mimic their donor’s style of organization and “post-materialist 
values”.179 Also Aleksandra Chauhan has noted that foreign aid “encourages NGOs to 
develop ties of accountability to the donor, rather than to domestic constituencies”.180 Sada 
Aksartova even claims that Western donors have been “guided by considerations having 
little to do with the needs and characteristics of receiving societies”.181 
In the Kremlin, the foreign sponsorship of NGOs in Russia is seemingly seen within the 
logic of a zero-sum game – an increase in foreign influence means a reduction of Russian 
sovereignty. Especially, the combination of political activity and foreign funding has been 
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heavily attacked verbally by Kremlin representatives. Both following quotes originate with 
Vladimir Putin: 
I am against having foreign governments finance political activity in our 
country, just as our government should not finance political activity in other 
countries.182  
I object categorically to foreign funding of political activity in the Russian 
federation. I object to it categorically. Not a single self-respecting country 
allows that and neither will we.183 
Putin also refers explicitly to NGOs in similar phrases: 
I can say – and I think it is clear for all – that when non-governmental 
organizations are financed by foreign governments, we see them as an 
instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies.184 
[The amendments to the NGO legislation are] aimed at preventing the 
intrusion of foreign states into Russia’s internal political life.185 
Kim Reimann, that examines the worldwide growth of NGOs from a top-down perspective, 
holds that internationally oriented NGOs are “social actors that persuade, pressure and teach 
states new ideas, values, and practices” so as to socialize them into accordance of the 
international value hegemony.186 The Kremlin accusations are sharper, however, and include 
accusations of outright espionage. Nikolaj Patrušev, then head of the FSB, warned in 2006 
against a “sharp increase” in espionage under the cover of international organizations.187 
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Putin has explicitly stated that the NGO-law was needed to “combat terrorism and stop 
foreign spies using NGOs as cover”.188 
Human rights are part of the essential democratic values Russia demands to take part in 
defining as a ‘sovereign democracy’. As Putin stated in Munich 2007: “Incidentally, Russia –
we– are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us 
do not want to learn themselves”.189 Within the Kremlin rhetoric from 2006 through 2008, 
the universality of democratic values is typically not challenged, although the Western 
prerogative to define them is.  In 2006 foreign minister Sergej Lavrov stated he was “deeply 
convinced that the fundamental values of democracy, even though they bear a universal 
character, are realized in each country in their own way, with due regard to national 
traditions and other peculiarities”.190 Similarly, Putin holds that “when speaking of common 
values, we should […] respect the historical diversity of European civilization. It would be 
useless and wrong to try to force artificial ‘standards’ on each other”.191  
The Kremlin’s sceptical attitude to the traditional Western demand for monopoly in deciding 
how democratic values should be realized coincides with a strong division within Russian 
civil society in terms of funding. Foreign donors have focused their aid on some key issues 
identified by Julia Khodorova as “civil society initiatives and institutions, development and 
sustainability, human rights, global environmental protection programs, HIV/AIDS, and 
economic development”.192 Henderson concludes that foreign funding has divided the 
Russian NGO community into “haves” and “haves nots”.193 The active expansion of Western 
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interests – combined with a growing sceptical attitude towards the Western value hegemony 
led to the Russian NGO issues becoming what a  Kremlin ideologist has called a “soft-power 
battleground between Russia and the west”.194 
The Kremlin Alternative 
At the beginning of his presidency, Putin complained that Russia’s effectiveness as a state 
was hampered as power was “mainly wasted on political struggle”. Putin goes a long way in 
suggesting a democracy without competition – built on graždanskoe soglasie, civil unity – 
being a key word in the speech.195 In the same way, the Kremlin promotes a civil society that 
abstains from making political decisions and rather provides assistance in implementing 
them.196 Patrušev holds the strong state responsible for telling NGOs “what problems they 
should tackle and for what purpose they should engage in activity”.197 In 2006, Lavrov 
suggested that Russian NGOs should support their state by help promoting Russia’s national 
interests and giving Russia a more positive image abroad.198 Obviously, human rights were 
on neither list of wanted NGO activities; already in 1999, as mentioned, Russian authorities 
demanded that NGOs operating in Russia removed the phrases ‘protection of human rights’ 
and ‘protection of citizens’ rights from their lists of official goals. The authorities stated that 
according to the constitution, this responsibility belonged with the state and NGOs were only 
legally entitled to assist the state and professional lawyers in their work.199 
In short, one might say that Russian civil society is torn between forces trying to implement 
‘civil society from abroad’ and ‘civil society from above’. Both concepts are arguably 
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oxymora, as the funding structure “involves a set of incentives and sanctions that […] 
undermines, rather than facilitates, civil behaviour”.200 
5.2 My Informants’ Take on Informal Rules 
5.2.1 Pinning Down the Informal Rules 
In the interviews, I asked the informants what constituted the extra-legal criteria for selective 
law enforcement against Russian NGOs. When relevant, I also inquired which informal rules 
they believed had been violated in the specific case of their NGO, and how this related to the 
subsequent legal prosecution. Depending on the expectations, the informants’ answers can be 
interpreted both as strikingly similar and strikingly different. On a few occasions the 
respondents connect the enforcement to recent triggers. More often the respondents believe 
that selective initiation of legal cases is connected to the organization’s profile or everyday 
activities being unpopular with the authorities.  
Recent Triggers 
In a few cases, the reasons for selective law enforcement are pinned down to exact projects. 
Most notable is the case of the European University of St. Petersburg, where a program 
regarding democratic elections was seen as a political initiated move in time for the voting 
for a new Russian president. The head of the university allegedly got a phone call confirming 
the informal background of the prosecution in a rather blunt way: “Either do you close the 
program, or we will close you”.201 Tatâna Barandova calls the whole incident “a stupid 
mistake in the presidential administration”. She states the it “believed that the EU created a 
university to control the election, but this is just nonsense – we got established in the 
nineties”.202 
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General Activities 
In explaining the informal reason for prosecution, several informants also refer to activities 
that the NGOs perform on a regular basis. The situation is especially difficult for “NGOs 
working on sensitive issues or on an international level”, states Natial’â Tabina.203 Anna 
Šarogradskaâ claims that the RPI got into problems because “the authorities feel 
uncomfortable with our work; arranging press-conferences, monitoring the press, giving 
voice to organizations or individuals with real problems, supporting films, books…”.204 
Šarogradskaâ also mentions that the institute’s relationship with foreign experts being 
unpopular with the government can have played a part in initiating the legal conflict. 205 
Foreign Funding 
Foreign funding is maybe the one most clearly identified extra-legal criterion for punishment. 
“Human rights organizations are the main victims of the law, as they receive foreign 
funding”, states one informant.206 “The situation is difficult for those who receive their 
funding from abroad” says another.207 Also Makim Timofeev and Taubina mention this 
criterion in similar ways.208 Žemkova and Šarogradskaâ, however, are both uncertain about 
the importance of funding. They both believe that foreign funding in general is not popular 
with the Russian authorities, yet they do not believe this to be a vital reason for why 
somebody chose to initiate prosecution against exactly their specific organizations.209 
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Blacklists 
The existence of blacklists is an issue several informants relate to informal rules.210 There are 
rumours of informal lists of organizations or individuals that form the basis for legal and 
other persecution. “If such a list exists, it is probably created by the FSB”, states Ûrij 
Džibladze, who is not willing neither to confirm nor disaffirm its existence.211 Taubina 
seems more certain of the blacklists’ existence: “They have a blacklist of the people they 
intimidate and I would not be surprised if they had one for NGOs as well”.212 Timofeev at 
Citizens’ Watch gives further explanation for these rumours. His NGO had experienced a 
sudden and unexplained halt in a cooperation project with the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD). The suspicious halt in cooperation suggests intervention from above, he explains. 
Timofeev also claims that he has unofficial information from an insider in the MVD that CW 
was on a list of neželatel’nye, organizations considered ‘unwanted’ by the government.213  
Šarogradskaâ mentions blacklisting in connection with journalists visiting the RPI. The 
institute earlier faced problems after it welcomed Eduard Limonov to hold a press conference 
on its premises.214 The RPI helps many different, and sometimes controversial, people, says 
Šarogradskaâ: “Some of the newsmakers could have been blacklisted by the authorities”. 215 
NGOs’ Profile 
When she states the criteria for selection, the executive director of Memorial Moscow 
focuses more on the NGO’s decision to stay independent, rather than its specific activities: 
“We got selected because of our independent position – we are not mainstream”.216 
Džibladze mentions “critical NGOs” as a group that has certainly faced extra problems in 
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recent years. He believes, however, that it is up to the enforcement agencies, the public and 
the NGOs alike to interpret signals from high politics.217 Taubina’s answer to the question 
concerning who are the most common victims of selective law enforcement is very general in 
character. She believes that the enforcement agencies “check up on NGOs depending on 
whether or not they are good in the minds of authorities”, underscoring that the exact 
background for prosecution varies with the cases.218 
Unclear Rules 
Kanevskaâ, the head of CERP, believes that human rights organizations have been 
specifically targeted for prosecution, and that CERP was no exception. She also, however, 
believes that a massive campaign has been undertaken against civil society in Russia: “If 
there are 100,000 NGOs left in two years time, this will be a positive number for us”.219 
Kanevskaâ fears that only pro-governmental organizations will be able to survive in the long 
run, in addition to those NGOs which possess “sufficient resources and ability to negotiate 
with the authorities”.220 
Kulaeva’s interpretation differs somewhat from the other informants. At the time of the 
interview the ADC Memorial had not been formally prosecuted. The only exception was 
some minor problems after a fire inspection, but Kulaeva did not interpret the inspection as 
illegitimate. Still, she states that “everything in Russia is selective”.221 Kulaeva believes the 
authorities are behind the selective prosecution.  Regarding the exact criteria for crackdown, 
however, she is in doubt. “When the law was signed, we immediately saw this as a political 
move, clearly against us. We were sure they would select us. It turned out, however, they 
really wielded [the NGO-law] against lots of apolitical NGOs, and so far they have not 
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selected us. The increase of controls are evident everywhere, not only against 
organizations”.222 
Also Džibladze expresses some doubt about how streamlined the process really is. Even 
though he believes some NGOs to be more often subjected to law enforcement than others, 
he underscores that there are many cases of unexpected crackdown. Džibladze  concludes: 
“The only rule that is clear for NGOs is not to make attention and keep your head low”, 
referring to the general risk associated with criticizing powerful interests in Russia.223 
5.2.2 Perceptions on the Origins and Communication of Informal 
Rules 
In my interviews, I was also interested in how the informal rules were communicated and the 
informants’ perceptions on who is pushing their informal agenda into the legal system. All 
the informants reply that ‘the authorities’ were behind their selective prosecution of their 
organization. In most cases, they leave the term ‘authorities’ undefined. I emphasize that the 
informants’ statements are clearly dependent on their different level of abstraction. 
The informants use terms as “the authorities”, “the political leadership”, “vlast’” (that is 
power/authorities), “the federal government”, and “the government” to describe who they 
perceive as behind selective law enforcement.224 In Russia, all of the above terms are 
associated with the executive branch of power. Although “the federal government” is at least 
explicit with regard to administrative level, most expressions remain rather vague.  
Particular Interests 
Amongst the informants, Anna Šarogradskaâ is the one who most clearly identifies regional 
forces behind the legal problems. Šarogradskaâ blames the “regional authorities, especially 
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governor [Valentina] Matvienko” for persecuting the NGO both in 2008 and earlier: “The 
city government simply wants to control the media in their region, and act on their own”.225 
Stefaniâ Kulaeva, on the other hand, does not believe in the power of regional authorities in 
contemporary Russia, especially not in St. Petersburg. According to Kulaeva, Russian 
politics is dominated by the “St. Petersburg mafia”. Therefore, she holds that federal politics 
and regional affairs in St. Petersburg are closely connected. “Nothing can happen without 
Moscow”, Kulaeva concludes. 
Tatâna Barandova is clear on who was behind the sudden closure of the EUSPB. For the 
purpose of explaining the political undercurrents, Barandova links the university’s problems 
to “the federal authorities”. Yet, she holds specific individuals within the presidential 
administration directly responsible for the fire inspectorate’s complaints against the 
university.226 As mentioned above, there was allegedly a call from the presidential 
administration confirming this connection. 
Flexible Mechanisms 
Ûrij Džibladze also focuses on the federal authorities. He does not, however, believe that 
most political prosecution is initiated manually on that level: “Rhetoric from high politics 
contain signals to lower officials, the public, and the NGOs alike. All the enforcement 
agencies can do is to guess how they are expected to behave”.227 
Natal’â Taubina’s thoughts on the issue can bring some order to this chaos. Who is behind 
the decisions to prosecute varies with the cases, she states: “In general, organizations are 
persecuted by those they have criticized – high profile NGOs means high profile decision-
makers”. She also seems to agree with some of Džibladze’s thoughts: “The FRS officials 
often made their decisions independently, but remained open for commands from executives 
[in important cases]”.228 
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Džibladze and Taubina are not the only informants who mention signals from high politics. 
When Barandova comments on the general situation of Russian NGOs, she also focuses on 
the authorities’ rhetoric: “There are waves of signals from power. Speeches… Foreigners can 
never understand the psychology”.229 Barandova might of course be right in her latter 
statement, but none the less I intend to make an attempt. 
5.3 Understanding Informal Rules – Their Nature, Origin 
and Communication. 
The informants’ perceptions of informal criteria behind legal prosecution are both strikingly 
different and strikingly similar, depending on the point of view. The responses to what 
constituted the extra-legal criteria behind punishment varied along several lines. 
Interestingly, the differences and similarities form certain patterns. 
More often than not, the perceptions of informal rules coincide with the government’s 
political signals. First, the informants often frame the extra-legal criteria within terms of the 
NGOs’ oppositional, critical or independent work. This position arguably contradicts the 
Kremlin ideal of civil unity as presented above. Alternatively, the informants’ relate selective 
law enforcement to their Western orientation, especially financial support from abroad, 
which is also a trait sharply criticized by the regime. Common to all informants is a strong 
sense of connection between informal rules and the perceptions of who was behind their 
formulation and enforcement. The answers to this question can be summed up as “we did 
something they did not like”. 
One Rule or Many Rules 
As seen above, there is a general agreement that extra-legal criteria are perceived to be a 
crucial factor for determining legal punishment.230 Furthermore, all the informants agree that 
it is the authorities that initiate such prosecution. In this sense, the informal aspect of 
selective law enforcement is commonly recognized among the informants’ NGOs. There is 
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also a general agreement on which informal rules that constitute the extra-legal criteria for 
punishment. However, this is only true when operating with broad and general categories. 
There are varying perceptions with regard to which informal rules are emphasized among the 
different informants. The informants’ explanations are especially varying when the 
informants identify exact reasons for prosecution of particular NGOs.  
Two of the initial research variables were set up to investigate informal rules. The 
informants, however, tended to focus not on the extra-legal criteria themselves, but on the 
repression and the repressor. Regardless of which trait or activity that was seen as the 
informal background for prosecution, they considered this of secondary importance. The 
interviewed NGO staff all perceived to have done something the authorities did not like, and 
interpreted the imposed punishment within this understanding. It thus seems reasonable to 
categorize the informal rules into two separate categories, differing both in origins and 
permanency. 
One rule is by the informants considered the fundamental principle behind selective 
prosecution in Russia – being unpopular with the regime de facto leads to punishment. Seen 
from this perspective, there is only one informal rule, although it can be formulated in many 
ways. This rule is recognized by all the informants and it is their principal way of framing 
their problems when they meet in interviews. The undisputable superiority of the authorities 
is unquestionably a recurring theme in Russian history. This core rule is therefore at least 
semi-permanent. As Marina Kurckchyian notes, there has never been a rule of law in Russia, 
but always a rule of men.231  
Regarding the more case-specific criteria, informants hold, among others, human rights 
activities, foreign funding, and promoting the opposition’s freedom of speech – to be 
possible criteria behind prosecution. Yet, the informants tend to look upon these criteria as 
simply what the authorities ‘happened to be dictating’ at the given time – these rules were 
considered subordinate or ad hoc. Ad hoc rules are all more in flux than the core rule and can 
be adjusted by the authorities on a relatively short notice by signalling their political will.  
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An Institutionalized Communication Channel 
The exact character of the subordinate informal rules is not seen as self-evident or permanent 
among the informants. With an exception for foreign funding, the subordinate rules are in 
flux and are interpreted differently in each specific case. Yet, the informants’ interpretations 
all stick to the same frame of reference, being the government’s rhetoric. I suggest that this 
may relate to the institutionalized core rule and the resulting establishment of a channel of 
communication, being rhetorical statements transmitted through the mass media. 
Several informants explicitly point to rhetoric being the source of their interpretation of 
informal rules. “Rhetoric from high politics contains signals to lower officials, the public, 
and the NGOs alike. All the enforcement agencies can do is to guess how they are expected 
to behave”, states Džibladze.232 As seen above, several informants think along similar lines. 
“The situation is difficult for those who receive their funding from abroad, but this is not 
because of the law but because of Putin’s rhetoric”, states one informant.233 According to my 
model of selective law enforcement this is partly true. Although the problems in a way do 
result from the law, Putin’s rhetoric seems to be a main source for the ad hoc informal rules 
as interpreted by the informants.  
The common recognition of the core rule ensures that the informants look to high-level 
rhetoric rather than to court documents to determine the reason for their punishment. Ad hoc 
informal rules can thus be communicated on a relatively short notice and do not need to be 
properly institutionalized for selective law enforcement to be effective. When I asked if the 
rhetoric in 2008 was not as aggressive as the years before, Taubina agreed and added: “why 
should it be – the message had already been delivered”.234  
Summarized, the government’s political signals have become a main source for 
interpretation of legal punishment, regardless of the authorities’ intentions and even without 
their explicit knowledge. Therefore, in theory selective law enforcement can exist in the 
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minds of the punished even if no external interests know of its existence. Interestingly, this 
does not hinder it from functioning as a deterrent. 
Signals to Enforcement Agencies 
Yet, it is hardly probable that the informants have developed their view on reality based on 
nothing but illusions. Furthermore, if the NGOs interpret their punishment in terms of 
governmental policies and rhetoric, it is reasonable to assume others will interpret the same 
signals in similar ways. The consequence is an atmosphere where both NGOs and law 
enforcers will experience pressure, which in turn may result in extra-legal patterns in formal 
law enforcement. This will again underpin the institutionalization of the core rule. Although 
the evidence presented here is too limited to draw any conclusions, this way of explaining 
rather streamlined selective law enforcement may provide a platform for further studies. 
Following this line of thought, authorities on different level and in different positions can all 
make their interpretation of the signals from high-politics. In this way the enforcement 
agencies may work independently on an everyday-basis, while executives on different levels 
can exercise additional pressure and even take manual control where they see fit, as was 
seemingly the case in the temporary closure of the EUSPB. At the same time, authorities 
lower down the hierarchy of influence can add additional pressure and also get personally 
involved when they see fit, as long as they do not contradict the Kremlin signals (Fig3). 
Some informants believe that the authorities produce and spread blacklists to signal to 
enforcement agencies what NGOs or individuals should be targeted for persecution. Without 
further evidence, this line of thought does not amount to much more than speculation. 
Furthermore, even if authorities do control selective law enforcement through blacklists, this 
does not explain how the punished have developed a perception of informal rules. As 
stressed above, the informal reason for their punishment must be known for the enforcement 
to be effective as a deterrent. To keep this information hidden will therefore be a bad 
strategy. Blacklists can, however, play a supportive role in streamlining enforcement, 
eliminating possible cases of misunderstanding and limiting lower bureaucrats’ power of 
interpretation. 
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Figure 3: Communication of ad hoc informal rules in selective law 
enforcement against Russian NGOs 
 
If the rhetoric of the federal authorities was not backed up with punishment or threats of 
punishment, it would simply equal norm transfer or propaganda. It is certainly legitimate for 
a regime to develop policies and signal its political will. Selective law enforcement, 
however, manipulates the reception of this rhetoric amongst the directly involved subjects. In 
the realm of Russian NGOs, selective law enforcement therefore functions as a mechanism 
to support political signals by enacting formal punishment where they are not followed. 
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6. Further Analysis and Theoretical Implications 
6.1 Selective Law Enforcement as a Governmental Tool 
Although there are some variations in each informant’s definition of the term ‘authorities’, 
the general picture is clear enough: if we take the informants’ statements at all seriously, the 
mechanism of selective law enforcement is clearly intended to further the informal interests 
of the Russian regime. The law is seen as a weapon used by the executives to eliminate, or at 
least seriously hamper, political opposition and insulate Russian society from Western 
influences. 
The informants insist that political authorities are behind the processes of selective law 
enforcement. This suggestion might at first glance seem strange. Why would the authorities 
want to penetrate ‘their own’ formal institutions? Are not informal practices in conflict with 
the concept of a strong state, being a formal arrangement by definition? I will argue that there 
are several incentives from the authorities’ point of view for keeping up these practices, even 
though – or exactly because – they undermine the Russian state’s democratic institutions. In 
this regard, it is vital not to confuse the authoritarian leaders with the state itself. 
Below, I present some thoughts on why selective law enforcement can be a viable strategy 
for hybrid or authoritarian regimes on some issues. The thesis does not make any 
presumptions about the Russian regime’s intent in this regard. Rather, I discuss how 
selective law enforcement makes sense as a way to promote undemocratic interests within 
the constraints of formal democracy. Thus, the mechanism provides a valuable tool for 
hybrid regimes mimicking democratic institutions while at least in part filling them with 
authoritarian content. To what degree Russian authorities deliberately manipulate the legal 
system on a grand scale, I leave for other projects to investigate. 
Authoritarian Leaders and the State 
To discuss selective law enforcement as a tool of social engineering wielded by the 
authorities, it is crucial to look at whose voices the authorities represent. Putin’s slogan to 
create a sil’noe gosudarstvo, a strong state, can mislead observers to believe that the political 
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leadership is guided by a motive to ensure a high state capacity, that is “capacity to secure 
compliance with formal legal directives”.235 Incoherent legislation characterized by massive 
non-compliance is obviously undermining a strong state in this regard. 
The leadership of a state, however, does not equal the state itself. Especially in authoritarian 
or semi-authoritarian regimes, the political leadership will not necessarily work to promote 
the state’s interests. They might just as well promote the interests of their elite group, 
alternatively their own personal power. Put simply, the individuals in the political leadership 
seek to regulate society according to their own wishes. This may arguably be the case in any 
government. In authoritarian regimes, however, there are few if any effective checks on 
potential abuse of power. 
If we want to include the intentions of authoritarian leaders into our discussion, we should 
not automatically accept the premise that the leadership wants compliance with formal rules. 
Rather, we should pay more attention to informal rules. Any action that increases the level of 
compliance with the informal rules promotes the interests of the agents formulating them, be 
it the president or a plumber. This is also true for selective enforcement, being a mechanism 
enforcing informal rules. 
Hybrid Mechanisms as an Effective Means of Control 
One scholar who has challenged the notion of a negative correlation between informal 
penetration and the strength of the regime is Keith Darden. Darden bases his research on 
various hybrid regimes and points to how corruption can be, and indeed has been, used as a 
tool by the political leadership.236 For his research on Ukraine, he applies taped records of 
the former Ukrainian president, Leonid Kučma.237 Darden finds that the Ukrainian 
government kept a list of legal offences committed by state officials, but signalled to enforce 
the law only when officials displayed disloyalty to Kučma and his regime. As Darden points 
out: “The threat of exposing [the official’s] wrongdoing constitutes an enormously powerful 
                                                 
235
 Darden, Keith (2002): Graft and Governance: Corruption as an Informal Mechanism of State Control. d. New Haven: 
Yale University, p. 6. Available at http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=BA9149F1-
413C-5AC4-28C4-418F883E5347&lng=en, accessed March 30, 2009. 
236
 Darden (2002). 
237
 Leonid Kučma was the president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005. 
 87 
sanction […] This sanction allows the state leadership to practice a systematic form of 
blackmail with payment extracted not in cash but in obedience”.238 Because authorities can 
benefit from mass-violation, they do not necessarily want formal rules to be followed. In 
Kučma’s regime, the pervasive corruptness of governmental officials created a mechanism 
where loyalty could be enforced through threats of legal sanctions. 
I argue in this thesis that the most important purpose of selective law enforcement is not the 
punishment itself, but rather its function as a deterrent. The Kučma-regime’s strategy 
resembles one possible variant of Ledeneva’s’ kompromat or  Lauth’s threat perception. Not 
least does it resemble Ledeneva’s suspended punishment, being exactly the threat of 
selective law enforcement.239 Ledeneva’s model is based on formal mass non-compliance, 
and the assumption that “the violation of unwritten rules can result in the enforcement of 
written ones”.240 In Darden’s research, the unwritten rules were summed up as loyalty to the 
political leadership. Notably, this equals the core rule in the presented research.  
There is, however, one crucial difference between Ledeneva’s and Darden’s 
conceptualization of informality; their approaches to agency. Ledeneva focuses on the 
individual actors’ strategies to cope with the formal institutional insufficiencies – the 
“improvisation on the enabling aspects of these constrains”.241 Darden, as well as my own 
research, suggests that the “enabling aspects” of these insufficiencies can be used as a large 
scale tool of social engineering. Ledeneva provides a model on how non-transparency in the 
economy is reproduced. I suggest that authoritarian leaders can benefit from the non-
transparency, thus having incentives to contribute to its reproduction.  
Mimic Democracy – Legitimacy at Home and Abroad  
I have argued that informal or rather semiformal control can be just as effective as formal in 
some cases. Still, rulers, including autocrats, have since the days of Hammurabi developed 
formal regulation to control society. Its effectiveness is unquestionable, and it is not without 
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reason that law is considered a cornerstone of advanced societies.242 One might therefore 
ask: if the executive authorities are in control of the legislative branch, as is often the case in 
authoritarian or hybrid regimes and certainly the case in today’s Russia, and at the same time 
have interests outside the legal sphere – why do they not formalize these interests?243  
First, it is hardly legally possible to formalize the informal rules in our context within the 
constraints of the Russian constitution and international conventions. Most obviously, the 
informal rules contradict democratic rights such as freedom of speech and freedom to form 
organizations.244 Second, there are limits to how far a regime can stretch its legitimacy. The 
legal arrangements can theoretically be made, but the regime would still be faced with 
tremendous pressure from both within and outside the country’s borders. In short, 
formalizing the informal rules would possibly amount to political suicide. 
Selective law enforcement as a way of enforcing compliance to informal rules is relatively 
cost effective with regard to moral resources – that is, it does not harm the regime’s 
legitimacy dramatically. As the informal rules and the mechanism through which they are 
enforced are not normatively accepted, it makes sense to keep the procedures pro forma and 
to not formally recognize their informal origins. We should not ignore the legitimacy that the 
formal legal system lends the mechanism of selective law enforcement. Even in Russia, 
where the legal system is known to enjoy a very low level of trust, it is still superior to most 
alternative methods to get rid of opposition.245 Putin famously fronted “dictatorship of the 
law” as a guiding principle for his restoration of legal unity in Russia. Medvedev entered the 
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presidential chair on a similar promise to get rid of the “legal nihilism” in the country. Even 
the authoritarian Soviet leadership recognized legal processes as a source of legitimacy.246 
Furthermore, pro forma law enforcement is not only a way of legitimizing a controversial 
practice at home. On the contrary, the conflict has a distinct international aspect, and attracts 
a fair amount of attention from abroad, not least from the donors. Even if the legal practice is 
criticized, the mechanism provides the persecution with a cloak of at least some legitimacy. 
Moscow defines itself within the broad category of modern democracies, insisting on being 
taken as a serious actor in international affairs. As Larry Diamond points out, alternative 
sources of legitimacy for political regimes have almost disappeared from the global scene the 
latest decades. In the contemporary era, Diamond argued in 2002, “democracy is the only 
broadly legitimate regime form, and regimes have felt unprecedented pressure (international 
and domestic) to adopt – or at least mimic – the democratic form”.247 By the so-called third 
wave of democratization, according to Diamond, the number of authoritarian systems with 
democratic traits increased more than the number of authentic democracies.248 Democratic 
institutions are also a formal criterion for membership in many powerful international 
organizations. It is in this regard easy to look at the formal democratic structure, while the 
degree of real democratic content is essentially disputable. 
Dozens of terms have been applied to pin down post-Soviet Russia’s regime type, not least 
Putin’s regime.249 Common to most of the conceptualizations is that while Russia’s formal 
system is largely democratic in form, it is in part filled with authoritarian content. In other 
words, the regime mimics democracy. Selective law enforcement, as a tool to streamline 
society according to the authorities’ informal wishes, fits this generalization perfectly. 
Within the logic of a mimic democracy, it is certainly more appropriate to get rid of the 
“internal enemy” through pro forma legal prosecution than through brute force. 
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Conclusively, the informal component’s relationship to the formal in selective law 
enforcement is not necessarily parasitic in the eyes of the political leadership. Rather, the 
authoritarian leaders may view the relationship as symbiotic, where the informal and formal 
components of the hybrid legal system complement each other. Within this logic, law can be 
deliberately legislated in a way that gives room for the executives to ensure their own 
prerogatives will not be threatened.  To refer to Lauth’s typology, the relationship between 
the parts can be either complementary or competitive, all depending on the point of view.250 
As mentioned, by way of selective law enforcement the political leadership can promote 
undemocratic interests within the constraints imposed by formal democracy.  
6.2 Understanding Partial Enforcement 
In theory, if the punishment corresponds to the expectations of all participants in all cases, 
the informal rules would amount to an informal, yet in a way transparent and predictable set 
of shadow legislation parallel to the formal legislation – a parallel set of rules enforced 
through the same formal channels. In reality, however, constant negotiation and conflict 
takes place between the law enforcers and the ones to be punished. The informants have a 
perception of why they get punished, but refuse to accept the legitimacy of this practice. 
Instead of adapting, the NGOs often fight to reduce the negative impact and mobilize both 
formal rights and informal power in this struggle. 
Some NGOs have experienced internal disagreements because of the political sensitivity of 
their issues. Furthermore, the hidden impact of so-called self censorship is impossible to 
estimate. Some NGO workers, however, react to punishment by getting even more 
determined to fight what they see as the wrong-doings of the regime. Evidently, non-
compliance is still a valid alternative to adaptation within the Russian NGO-community. A 
small but active group of NGOs will in the foreseeable future continue to work according to 
the very same principles they believe to be the reason for their prosecution. Disagreement 
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and polarization within the NGO community along political lines have been important 
consequences of this partial enforcement of informal obedience.251 
Persistent non-compliance with informal rules indicates the relative weakness of the 
mechanism of selective law enforcement. The principal purpose of selective law enforcement 
is to enforce the informal rules set by the initiators of the process. A high degree of non-
compliance indicates a low functionality in the mechanism and can be explained by 
imperfect conditions for its functioning in the formal and/or the informal realm. Non-
compliance will be a rational reaction if (1) the subjects do not recognize the informal rules 
behind the punishment (matters of communication); and/or (2) the subjects do not believe in 
the capabilities of the state apparatus to enforce them (matters of relative strength). 
6.2.1 Matters of Communication 
The mechanism of selective law enforcement can be seen as more or less institutionalized 
among the informants in terms of its recognition. The human rights NGOs recognize that 
certain traits are considered unwanted by the authorities, and they share interpretations of 
both their origins and their communication. Mainly, they focus on a core rule that links 
disobedience to the political leadership with potential punishment. The Russian authorities 
have been explicit in communicating their ideals, which the NGOs interpret as ad hoc rules, 
more case-specific rules to fill the core rule with more concise meaning. The NGOs perceive 
themselves as non-compliers with this set of rules. There are seemingly no fundamental 
weaknesses in the mechanism of selective law enforcement in terms of communication. 
At the same time, the ad hoc informal rules are not as clear as they might have been had they 
been written. There seems to be some uncertainty regarding the exact nature of these 
informal rules and the punishment is not always according to the expectations. Regardless of 
the theoretical models, uncertainty remains an important part of the picture. On the one hand, 
this uncertainty blurs the perception of a causal link between non-compliance and 
punishment and will thus hinder a streamlined enforcement mechanism. On the other hand, 
uncertainty creates an atmosphere in which nobody can rely on the permanency of their 
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organization. An unpredictable atmosphere will lead to statements like Džibladze’s: “The 
only rule that is clear for NGOs is not to make attention and keep your head low”.252 
Constant uncertainty has several negative consequences for the NGOs, as will be elaborated 
in the final section of this chapter. Džibladze even holds that “uncertainty is one of Putin’s 
main tools”.253 The informants do not, however, perceive the enforcement to be completely 
arbitrary. If punishment was considered entirely random, there would be no incentives to 
adapt to informal rules. For selective law enforcement to take place there must be a selection, 
or at the very least a perception of a selection. 
Conclusively, non-compliance among the informants’ NGOs only to a slight degree links to 
problems in communicating the informal rules. Yet, the ad hoc rules are rather vague and 
lead to a somewhat unpredictable situation. Most of the confusion about the rules originates 
in the actual punishment. As there is room for interpretation of the informal rules, non-
compliance is not considered the same thing by everyone – neither among NGOs nor 
enforcement agencies. 
6.2.2 Relative Formal Strength 
As noted, the mechanism of selective law enforcement is based on a malfunctioning formal 
system and a low degree of rule of law. At the same time, it is fully dependent on the formal 
enforcement structure’s ability to meet non-compliance with punishment. The less the 
subjects are hindered or deterred, the more attractive will the option of non-compliance 
become. In many of the cases against my informants, the law enforcement agencies have not 
been able to ensure that the government’s policy has been supported by legal sanctions, not 
least due to the courts reluctance to support them. Since the indirect consequences of legal 
problems are considerable, however, also the NGOs that have avoided formal legal sanctions 
suffer from the mechanism. 
The various characteristics of an ideal sowing ground for selective law enforcement must all 
be discussed in relation to each other; the strength of the enforcement agencies is only 
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important when compared to the competence of the NGOs lawyers; and/or to the courts’ 
ability to reject the agencies’ claims. The NGOs were acquitted due to their resources and 
legal skills in combination with the courts’ ability to reject the charges. Had the NGOs’ skills 
and resources been lower and/or the courts sufficiently biased, the NGOs might have 
experienced more severe punishment. Had the enforcement agencies prepared better cases, 
on the other hand, they might have been able to push through with some of them regardless 
of their opponent’s expertise. After all, the enforcement agencies had rather incoherent 
legislation at their disposal. 
The Battle on Formal Arenas 
Several informants surprised me with their focus on formal laws and how they insist to work 
strictly in accordance with their own interpretation of them. This might at first glance seem 
irrational, as the informants themselves believe that non-compliance with informal rules, not 
formal, constitutes the reasons for their legal problems. Furthermore, a common view on the 
NGO-law among critical Russian lawyers is that according to its provisions, everyone is in 
principle guilty.254 In the years from 2006 through 2008, the NGO lawyers proved 
themselves wrong. Rather than being a foundation for punishing everyone, the vague 
legislation leads to interpretation processes that the organizations themselves can take part in 
it 
It is no newsflash that money and resources can buy a suspect out of trouble through illegal, 
but also through legal channels. Top lawyers win cases – or  else they would not have been 
top lawyers. The research indicates that it is a reasonable choice for NGOs to fight the 
authorities on the formal arena, as long as they possess sufficient skills and resources. The 
enforcement agencies can seemingly prosecute most NGOs based on Russian legislation. To 
hand out the most severe sanctions however, they cannot escape the clinch with lawyers in 
court. Furthermore, all administrative legal sanctions can be appealed to the court system. If 
the court is not biased, the winners in court will be those who are best able to make sense of 
a senseless legislation. Among the scrutinized cases, the NGOs have been victorious in most 
of these clinches. 
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The NGO-law is characterized by incoherency. My research suggests, however, that 
incoherent legislation not necessarily leads to informal negotiations. The Russian legal 
system is open for discussing legality on formal arenas, especially when the charges are 
based on rubber paragraphs, which is a recurring foundation for the prosecution of my 
informants’ NGOs. After all, rubber paragraphs are negotiable by definition. 
In the 1990s, Ledeneva observed that “any change in the formal rules […] is perceived as yet 
another constraint to be dealt with informally”.255 Seemingly, Russia has changed since then. 
In the case of Russian human rights NGOs, the mechanism of selective law enforcement has 
fell victim to its dependency on the formal enforcement structure. To enforce informal rules, 
the mechanism needs a formal pretext. If this pretext is open for formal discussion, the need 
to engage in informal negotiations diminishes, and the authorities’ gains in form of increased 
compliance diminish correspondingly. 
Relative Competence 
Not only have NGO lawyers been able to fight the agencies’ application of rubber paragraphs 
– they have also been able to counteract accusations of administrative infringements based 
on both NGO and tax legislation. The cases filed by enforcement agencies often seem poorly 
prepared. Catch-all traps were not applied successfully except in a few cases. Especially 
when the charges were founded on tax legislation, the agencies displayed a low degree of 
professionalism regarding non-profit or charitable activity.  
To some degree, the acquittals in courts can be explained in terms of the relative strength of 
the parts on the formal arena. The gap between the NGO lawyers’ legal skills and the 
incompetence of the enforcement agencies concerning non-profit work seems to play an 
important role. At the very least, the informants themselves depict it this way.  
Almost every expert on Russian NGO legislation is associated with the NGO community.256 
Organized through their pravozaŝitnye organizacii257, they publish relevant material to help 
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NGOs stay legal within unclear legal framework. They also provide legal assistance to NGOs 
in conflict with law enforcement agencies, and report on cases they perceive to be politically 
motivated. From 2005 onwards, many NGO lawyers spent much time analysing the draft and 
final version of the new NGO-law. Several organizations have coordinated their efforts to 
analyse and withstand selective law enforcement. Their strategy to gain particular expertise 
on the 2006 amendments probably pays off. In short, the NGOs are supported by an active 
core of professional lawyers, which provide them with considerable definitional power. 
The informants characterize the FRS and the tax authorities as inefficient and unprofessional 
in their approach to NGOs. The FRS interpretation of the new NGO legislation has varied 
greatly from region to region. “The FRS staff was neither efficient nor professional”, states 
Džibladze: “They rather made some legal mistakes than not making a try”.258 Both 
Kanevskaâ and Krivonos also mention this overzealousness when characterizing the state 
agencies. “The state officials interpret the law as if everything that is not mentioned in the 
law is illegal”, states Kanevskaâ.259 Krivonos claim that the FRS operates with the principle 
of presumption of innocence put on its head: “everyone is guilty unless proven innocent”.260 
In almost all the charges against my informants’ NGOs that ended up in courts, the FRS filed 
legal accusations unable to hold up. In light of the low rate of acquittals in Russian courts, 
this is remarkable. 
Also Russian tax authorities are unprofessional in their approach to non-profit organizations, 
according both to Chauhan’s research and my informants’ statements.261 The tax authorities 
“approach the NGOs as if they were commercial, having no knowledge of the exceptions 
regarding non-commercial organizations”, states one of the informants.262 Many acquittals 
find legal basis in the same NGO legislation that is characterized as tailored made for 
repression. Also among the cases of the informants, charges based on such 
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misunderstandings seem to be recurring.263 The gap of expertise between NGOs and their 
state-controlled regulators has supposedly widened even further the recent years, as several 
of the more skilled lawyers earlier employed by the state now have joined the NGOs at the 
other end of the table.264 
The Possible Battle on Informal Arenas – A Caveat 
In an environment where selective law enforcement is possible but only partially functioning, 
potential targets have at least two choices. First, they can fight the pretext, and second, they 
can engage in informal bargaining. In many cases, the approach probably includes elements 
of both strategies. The research indicates that the former is a valid strategy for Russian NGOs 
with sufficient resources, weak legislation notwithstanding. The research does not, however, 
track down the latter strategy. In cases not of vital interests to the regime, punishment can 
probably be protracted indefinitely if the targets are able to offer something to influence the 
law enforcers’ decisions. According to one informant, only NGOs with the “ability to 
negotiate with the authorities” will survive the government’s pressure in long term.265 Until 
further research has been conducted, we cannot estimate the importance of such measures. 
In a few cases, the informants indicate how they have indeed pulled informal strings to 
influence the outcome of conflicts. When RPI had problems with authorities earlier, they 
managed to get off the hook because of contacts and friends who arranged a public campaign 
in their favour.266 Until further research has been conducted, all we can do is to keep in mind 
the following statement from one of the informants: “We are all experts with high education 
– we know how to adapt to Russian realities”.267 
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7. Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have argued that the hybrid mechanism of selective law enforcement is an 
identifiable phenomenon worthy of attention in its own right. I have argued that it consists of 
definite traits interrelating in specific ways. Furthermore, it has an identified purpose and is 
observable for research. Not least, the mechanism is crucial in shaping the everyday work of 
the informants. This initial research has obtained new insight of both case-specific and more 
general value for studies of selective law enforcement. Yet, much remains unclear regarding 
both its theoretical nature and its unfolding in Russian environment. I have sought to present 
the research’s empirical data in a language much influenced by the informants’ statements, 
while subsequently analysing it within a more theoretical language intended to illustrate its 
more generic relevance. 
In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the findings along the lines of the investigated 
variables outlined in the introduction. Second, I recap some of the main theoretical insights 
and discuss them in relation to various relevant academic discourses. Along the way, I 
suggest directions for further research. 
7.1 A Summary of the Investigated Variables 
The primary research question discussed in this thesis is how selective law enforcement 
unfolded against Russian NGOs in the years 2006 through 2008. The broad framing of the 
questions certainly does not lead to any short and concise answers. For methodological 
reasons, I identified four relevant variables, the investigation of which will be summarized 
below. The separate investigation of each of these all provided certain answers to the 
research question. Chapter 3 and 5 draw upon these findings to provide a more complex 
analysis of the phenomenon’s unfolding in the theoretical as well as the empirical realm. In 
the investigated empirical context, informants depicted selective law enforcement to be a 
mechanism of political control. This provided for a whole range of new perspectives 
deserving further research. In terms of the mechanism’s ability to enforce informal rules, I 
find the outcome suboptimal for both the relevant informal interests and the NGOs alike. 
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1) The Legal Foundation for Selective Law Enforcement 
The legal foundation for selective law enforcement among the informants’ NGOs is 
dominated by NGO legislation. Also tax legislation plays a significant role and the 
enforcement of these two bodies of legislation often plays out in concert. The research also 
examined individual cases founded on other legislation. There are in principle no limits as to 
which legislation can be wielded selectively, granted the institutionalization of selective law 
enforcement. Yet, there are certain traits that make some legislation have a greater potential 
for purposes of selective law enforcement than others. These are summed up in my typology 
of incoherence, being my analysis of both earlier comments on Russian legislation and the 
charge raised against my informants’ NGOs. Although not exhaustive, such a typology 
should in principle be valid in any context where selective law enforcement is 
institutionalized through weak legislation. Naturally, the presence and utilization of each 
traits of incoherence will vary.  
2) The Punishment Imposed through Selective Law Enforcement.  
The second variable, being the imposed punishment, turned out to be less rigidly connected 
to formal punishment than initially expected. Three of the investigated cases resulted in 
formal sanctions, being the temporary closure of EUSPB and CERP in addition to the forced 
relocation of, and financial claims against RPI. The research also found punishment to take 
many forms, amongst which only some are formally recognized as such. This is echoed in 
recent reports on the implementation of the NGO-law, where the focus gradually has shifted 
to indirect consequences of political abuse of the law. The research identifies direct and 
indirect ways in which perceptions of punishment can contribute to enforce the informal 
rules. I emphasize the necessity to take these into account when discussing the 
phenomenon’s impact.  
3 and 4) The Extra-Legal Criteria the Punished Actors Perceive to be 
Behind the Punishment, and Perceptions Regarding the Informal Rules’ 
Origin and Means of Communication. 
The third and fourth variables investigate the informants’ perceptions and proved highly 
interrelated. My informants insisted the government was involved in defining the informal 
rules. Based on this, I examined governmental rhetoric on the topic. The research indicates 
that the informants interpret the punishment with reference to governmental rhetoric. In this 
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way, selective law enforcement manipulates the rhetoric’s reception among subjects directly 
involved. I also found that the concept of informal rules does not closely correspond to the 
informants’ conceptions of the basics of selective law enforcement. Rather, the informants 
stressed the repression itself and the repressing political leadership of the country. Notably, 
nobody mentioned economic or personal interests, or any interests outside the executive 
branch of power. 
7.2 Findings, Discourses and Suggested Directions for 
Further Research 
Selective Law Enforcement and Institutional Interrelations 
Since the concept of informal institutions began receiving academic attention in the 1990s, 
researchers have typically operated with informal and formal institutions as clearly 
differentiated phenomena. Some theoretical works referred to in this thesis have in various 
ways tried to identify how they interrelate. Lauth, Helmke and Levitsky base their typology 
of informal institutions on how they relate to the formal. In their work, it is evident that the 
relation between them is essential. This complicates the issues theoretically.  
Alena Ledeneva utilizes the concept of informal practices to challenge the sharp theoretical 
divisions between the formal and the informal. Informal practices are equally rooted in the 
informal and formal realm, she states. While the institutions are more or less abstract, the 
informal practices seek to describe actual societal behaviour. Indeed, Ledeneva ambitiously 
seeks to describe the way “Russia really works”.268 
This research draws upon both lines of thought. I try to structure my work within the 
terminology of formal and informal, and seek to describe large political structures and 
institutions, as do Lauth, Helmke and Levitsky. On the other hand, I claim that one cannot 
emphasize the importance of their relations without accepting their reciprocal influence and 
collective functioning. I therefore operate with selective law enforcement as a complex 
institution. Christopher Stefes refers to among others Lauth, Helmke and Levitsky when he 
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underscores the essential division between informal and formal structures. Enforcement of 
informal rules cannot include the official involvement of formal enforcement agencies, 
Stefes states.269 This study claims that said statement at the very least must be refined. 
Informal rules can, as argued in this research, be enforced through the mechanism of 
selective law enforcement. Within this mechanism of enforcing informal rules, official 
involvement of formal enforcement agencies is not only a possibility – it is a necessity.  
Punishment in Selective Law Enforcement – A Broad Perspective 
The research also shows how selective law enforcement carries with it serious implications 
for the prosecuted, even in cases where no legal sanctions are formally imposed. This insight 
is essential to understand the factual impact of selective law enforcement upon society. 
Administrative measures themselves can fill the role of punishment in enforcing informal 
rules through selective law enforcement. In the investigated field, the mandate to make 
inspections, for instance, is perceived as being used manipulatively. As inspections impose 
burdens on NGOs and are a resource in short supply, they play the same role in selective law 
enforcement as legal sanctions. Other legal processes, like defending an NGO in court, do 
not only draw heavily upon the organizations’ resources, but also lead to other problems. 
When society recognizes the informal reasons for the legal processes, the subject for 
prosecution can experience being stigmatized in authoritarian regimes where cooperation 
with opposition might be seen as risky. 
The broad impact of selective law enforcement is also evident from another perspective. 
Although deterrence is the most cost-effective way to prevent non-compliance in the long 
run, the mechanism of selective law enforcement can block non-compliance in short term. 
By reducing the non-compliers financial capability and keeping them preoccupied with 
administrative demands, potential non-compliers can be selectively blocked from 
functioning. In short, selectively implemented administrative measures can prove a powerful 
weapon in fighting political enemies by utilizing the states’ formal regulatory regimes. The 
structure of the punishment in selective law enforcement is therefore more complex than 
indicated in the theoretical model. How the state agencies can and do help regimes in 
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shaping society according to the authorities’ informal templates is certainly a question that 
deserves separate attention. 
The Balance of Legal Culture and Agency in Selective Law Enformcent 
The theoretical model operates with an agent using the law manipulatively to promote her 
informal interests. In the introduction, I define selective law enforcement to be the pursuit of 
legally imposed punishment – a definition based on intentions. The research, however, is one 
of perceptions. With regard to the unfolding and consequences of selective law enforcement, 
this approach may be even more useful than one based on intentions. The research further 
underscores the importance of perceptions – also in the second of the variables I initially 
approached as formal, namely punishment. 
As I stress in the theoretical model, the subject’s own interpretation of the punishment is 
crucial for her decision on how she adjusts her behaviour. Also the question if punishment 
has taken place is subject to interpretation. Thus, changes in the behaviour of subjects can 
take place regardless of factual intentions behind the prosecution. In some cases, the subjects 
will experience being selected even if the crackdown is entirely random. When investigating 
selective law enforcement from a functionalistic point of view, there need be no agent behind 
its initiation. Even without an agent, the subjects can perceive punishment and relate this to 
informal rules and an agent formulating and enforcing them. The perceived agents do not 
necessarily have the same perceptions of the events. 
The functionalistic approach has its limits. Perceptions do not manifest out of thin air. One 
criterion is that the phenomenon of selective law enforcement is institutionalized in the 
actors’ political culture. Also, I emphasize that in the investigated empirical field, the 
existence of agents in selective law enforcement is more than mere illusions. I do suggest, 
however, that the influence of legal culture upon the questions of agency in selective law 
enforcement deserves more research. Federal authorities hardly initiate most individual cases 
of selective law enforcement manually. Yet, the authorities are certainly aware of the 
ongoing persecution and clearly guilty of neglecting it. 
In chapter 5, I discuss how enforcement agencies and NGOs alike may operate according to 
their interpretation of both formal and informal rules. Granted the formal rules’ incoherency, 
the agencies have to make a selection. The political culture provides guidance on what basis 
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this selection can be made, as Russia has long traditions of the authorities’ influencing legal 
processes informally. The result is a mechanism in which the government can rely on their 
political signals to be interpreted as enforceable rules by both enforcement agencies and 
other subjects of Russian law. 
Conclusively, in some cases, selective law enforcement draws heavily upon legal culture not 
only for normalizing the actors’ practices, but also for creating perceptions of casual links 
that are not always shared by the perceived agents. The intertwined issues of agency and 
cultural patterns in selective law enforcement should make for further interesting research. 
Selective Law Enforcement and the Hybrid Regime. 
The research has a wide scope. Selective law enforcement can probably be identified in 
various forms in many parts of the world. Its very logic resembles that of hybrid regimes as a 
whole. As argued above, political regimes that fully disregard the principles of democracy 
have almost disappeared from the global scene in the latest decades. This is also true for 
contemporary Russia. Through a case study on how selective law enforcement has unfolded 
in Russia, I make findings that may prove useful for this debate.  
As argued in the introduction, selective law enforcement plays on different interpretation of 
the relations between law and state. First, it tells a story on how the law can function within 
the logic of rule by law – in which the law is seen as a governmental instrument. When 
legislation is incoherent, society will be marked by mass non-compliance. If there in addition 
is no principle of legal egalitarianism, everyone is liable for punishment. This leads to a pick 
and choose game of prosecution where the powerful can dictate the rules. Simultaneously, 
however, the regime plays upon the legitimizing effect of the rule of law, being a powerful 
symbol of legitimacy in most or all contemporary regimes. As the hybrid regime strives for 
the legitimacy granted by independent courts, the courts can indeed oppose the government 
in less important cases.  
In rule by law regimes the principle of “no criminal punishment without a pre-existing law” 
is usually implemented. Punishment, however, is more than criminal punishment, and 
various administrative measures allow for the rule by law to be effective regardless of what 
the judicial branch deems correct. Within such a ‘rule by administrative law’ system, the 
opposition is bound to struggle. As a governmental tool for social engineering, I suggest that 
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selective law enforcement is a way for hybrid regimes to promote undemocratic interests 
within the constraints of formal democracy. A phenomenon recognized by its democratic 
form and its authoritarian content, I view selective law enforcement as fitting perfectly the 
logic of hybrid regimes mimicking democratic practices. 
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